ACHIEVING WORKERS' RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

Edited by Richard P. Appelbaum
and Nelson Lichtenstein

ILR PRESS, AN IMPRINT OF CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS
ITHACA AND LONDON

First published 2016 by Cornell University Press
First printing, Cornell Paperbacks, 2016
Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Appelbaum, Richard P., editor. | Lichtenstein, Nelson, editor.
Title: Achieving workers' rights in the global economy / edited by Richard P. Appelbaum and Nelson Lichtenstein.
Description: Ithaca ; London : ILR Press, an imprint of Cornell University Press, 2016. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2015048042
ISBN 9781501700033 (cloth : alk. paper)
ISBN 9781501700040 (pbk. : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Employee rights. | Labor and globalization.
Classification: LCC HD6971.8 .A24 2016 | DDC 331.01/1—dc23
LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2015048042

Cornell University Press strives to use environmentally responsible suppliers and materials to the fullest extent possible in the publishing of its books. Such materials include vegetable-based, low-VOC inks and acid-free papers that are recycled, totally chlorine-free, or partly composed of nonwood fibers. For further information, visit our website at www.cornellpress.cornell.edu.

Cloth printing	10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Paperback printing	10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

This book is dedicated to the 1,138 people who lost their lives at Rana Plaza

acted collectively through labor unions; the state created and enforced regulations designed to protect workers' rights. Unionization and worker's rights were the result of decades of labor struggles. This arrangement, frequently referred to as the American social contract, has given way in the twenty-first century to a new arrangement in which two of the three key players, workers and the state, are replaced by other actors: independently owned contract factories and monitoring firms.

The result is a new tripartite model: brands and retailers produce their goods through contract factories, then hire firms to monitor their factories and privately report back their findings. This new arrangement, sometimes termed a "social accountability contract,"[29] effectively makes corporations responsible for governing themselves. This outcome had long been preferred by business, but was reluctantly conceded during the course of the twentieth century in response to growing labor power. But as the power of labor weakened, businesses—long opposed to state regulation—returned to a nineteenth-century approach to economic governance, this time on a global scale. The current prevailing belief in unfettered markets, the power of firms over states, the WTO prohibition of including social clauses in trade agreements, the intentional weakness of the ILO and its nonbinding conventions—all of these have created a space in which companies could effectively argue that a "trust me" approach was the only workable solution to the problem of sweatshops.

3

CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

Moving from Checklist Monitoring to Contractual Obligation?

Jill Esbenshade

Codes of conduct and monitoring are the most prevalent form of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in global supply chains. According to the *New York Times*, more than fifty thousand factories employing millions of workers go through "social audits" each year (Clifford and Greenhouse 2013). There is evidence that to some degree codes and monitoring systems have changed the landscape in which brands and factories operate: there is now acceptance of public disclosure of factory names and locations, which was once held to be an unbreachable trade secret; recently there have been incidents of brands taking responsibility for unpaid back wages and severance, a still rare but previously unknown occurrence in the global supply chains constructed in part to avoid such liability; and there are indications that brands may be consolidating their far-flung production networks that have become unmanageable in the age of disclosure and monitoring (Gereffi 2013).

However, academic researchers, and more recently the popular press, have found that codes and monitoring are not equal to the task of significantly raising standards in the industry. Researchers point to some measure of improvements but emphasize that violations continue, in some areas unabated. Mark Anner's comprehensive study of the Fair Labor Association (2012a) and Patricia Barrientos and Sally Smith's (2007) study of the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) find that even in Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives (MSIs), which involve governance by a combination of companies and NGOs, and where there are mutually agreed-on standards for codes and monitoring, effectiveness of monitoring is restricted to certain code provisions. Whereas Anner analyzes detection by violation type in

over eight hundred audit reports, Barrientos and Smith evaluate improvements in twelve in-depth garment factory cases through actually reauditing monitored factories. These disparate studies find significant attention in some "outcome standards" (health and safety, payment of required wages, and hours), little to no detection or improvement in others (living wage, permanent employment, harsh treatment, discrimination), and no progress in "process rights" (freedom of association, collective bargaining). Richard Locke's book, based on a decade of research, including hundreds of interviews, factory visits, and audit reviews of company monitoring, finds that in the areas where there have been improvements, most notably health and safety, compliance levels have plateaued and that on issues such as freedom of association and excessive working hours there have been no improvements (Locke 2013).

Overall codes have failed to measurably alter the egregious conditions for workers on the shop floor: with few exceptions workers are not paid living wages and are not able to organize, and they are *regularly* cheated out of mandatory pay, benefits, and severance. In fact, workers are owed tens of millions of dollars, and worse yet they are dying by the score in fires and building collapses. And this is happening in factories that are monitored and that often pass inspections (Claeson 2012). After almost two decades of codes of conduct and monitoring, violations are still the norm, not the exception.

This does not mean that codes and monitoring are completely misguided, rather, that they are limited; they are a salve, not a cure. I will argue below that the challenge is for codes and monitoring to change the structure of the industry, which is the only real way to address violations, and in order to create such change codes and monitoring must involve binding—not simply voluntary—agreements to which workers are a party.

Literature Evaluating Codes and Monitoring

What follows is a review of the literature on the successes, failures, and challenges of codes and monitoring covering fifty studies from the last decade on the topic. In its totality the literature emphasizes the following factors as having a positive effect on reducing (although in no way eliminating) violations. First, specific monitoring practices have been found to have a greater effect on reducing violations, and worker participation in monitoring is central to building a sustainable program from identifying problems to ensuring remediation. Second, the independence of monitors and the transparency of their reporting are crucial to ensuring that results have validity and can be effectively used to correct violations. Although the specifics of monitoring are crucial to its effectiveness, monitoring

exists within a constellation of power relationships that determine not only the thoroughness of monitoring practices but also how results are implemented and acted on. The following sections deal with the role of consumers, local governments, and brands, all of whom set the context for and ultimately determine the likelihood of compliance. The final area explored in much of the literature is the inability of current monitoring to affect the structure of sourcing, which is the ultimate cause of violations. After the literature review I will add a largely overlooked factor to eliminating violations: to what extent monitoring is contractual and if it includes workers as party to the contract. I end this chapter with a variety of examples of the emergence of contractual obligations in monitoring; many of these examples also have a direct impact on the structure of sourcing.

Monitoring Practices and Worker Participation

Although monitoring is often referred to as social auditing, in fact there are no standardized practices as there are in accounting audits. Monitoring is conducted by a mishmash of internal, commercial, and independent auditors. It lacks uniformly accepted standards in terms of both what is monitored and how inspections are conducted. Broadly speaking, monitoring includes: self-assessment, brand compliance visits, "third-party" auditing by an entity hired by the brand (or sometimes contractor), "fourth-party" monitoring paid for by an oversight organization to which the brand belongs (like the FLA), and independent monitoring conducted by a group (like the Worker Rights Consortium, WRC) in which companies have no role. There is no uniform code and codes vary on such points as minimum age (Kolk and van Tulder 2002), inclusion of freedom of association and collective bargaining, and aspirations of a living wage (Jenkins 2002). Some important areas, such as building safety, have not historically been included at all. There is also variance as to whether monitoring is a checklist operation that simply captures the day of the inspection or includes a review of policies and implementation procedures on such issues as age documentation, fire drills, or antidiscrimination.

Richard Locke, a political scientist and business professor who works with leading global corporations to implement sustainable business practices, has analyzed the largest set of private audits. He finds that not only is the checklist method the base model for private and third-party monitoring but also that the checklist is not usually completed, as many auditors face such time constraints that once they find their quota of violations they move on to the next factory, not even finishing the checklist much less delving deeper into the violations they find. In *The Promise and Limits of Private Power*, Locke laments that whereas he believed in the "promise" of the enterprise of private monitoring before his

research, he had to conclude that "in reality, the information collected through the audits is biased, incomplete and often inaccurate" (Locke 2013, 38).

To the extent that monitoring can be effective, researchers have identified two specific practices as being important in more accurate verification protocols: unannounced visits and confidential off-site worker interviews. The labor sociologist Jill Esbenshade (2004a), the environmental policy professor and cofounder of GoodGuide, Dara O'Rourke (2000), and Locke (2013) all reveal weaknesses in the private monitoring system through ethnographic research, which includes observing monitors at work. Off-site interviews are necessary, as O'Rourke (2006) documents that in interviews conducted in factories, management knows who is being interviewed, the questions being asked, and the length of time each interview lasts. Esbenshade (2004a) concurs, describing cases in Los Angeles where interviews are conducted on the shop floor and supervisors are even asked to translate. Locke (2013) reports that often employee interviews are not conducted at all. As a counterexample, the labor relations professor and director of the Center for Global Workers' Rights, Mark Anner (2012a), argues that in the Better Work Vietnam program, monitors from the UN's International Labour Organization (ILO), whose standards require them to take worker testimony seriously, actually find much higher rates of process violations.

Researchers have found that unannounced visits are crucial not only for the integrity of the physical inspection of the factory but also for the validity of the record checks, which constitute the basis of most audits. The professor of economics and management David Weil, who is the author of *The Fissured Workplace* (2014) and was Obama's head of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor (DOL), analyzed ninety-eight DOL surveys of Los Angeles apparel contractors from inspections conducted in 2000. He found that the two most effective of the seven evaluated monitoring components (which did not include off-site interviews), were the combination of payroll review and unannounced visits. Weil concludes that record checks must be coupled with unannounced visits in order to ensure that written documentation reflects reality. Record checks on announced visits are much less effective because keeping two sets of books is a common practice, one set in which workers' actual hours and pay are recorded, and a second set that is doctored to reflect compliance with labor standards (Weil 2005; 2010). Looking at the program in Los Angeles, Esbenshade finds that surveillance outside the factory was often counted as an unannounced visit, even when the actual appointment to check books and interview employees was made in advance. Because books were not on kept on site, one monitoring company that did conduct truly unannounced visits allowed the books to be sent over within three days, undermining the value of the unannounced inspection (Esbenshade 2004, 71–75). British researchers Barrientos and Smith (2007) consistently find

violations in reauditing suppliers who had been giving passing audits through the United Kingdom's multistakeholder ETI program. They find that auditors catch primarily visible problems. They conclude that the inaccuracy of auditing results is due largely to the widespread use of double books and of coaching workers before interviews. Locke's review of hundreds of audits also found that false results are a consequence of the common use of double books, and he notes that factory owners learn over time to doctor records. He asserts that inaccurate results are partially due to the fact that auditors use a financial audit model, which privileges written documentation over worker testimony (Locke 2013, 35–37).

Although unannounced visits and off-site interviews may seem like obvious steps, they are not accepted practice. For private monitors and company sponsored CSR programs, these practices are *not* the norm. In 2006, the three largest retailers in the world, Walmart, Tesco, and Carrefour, joined a number of other firms in founding the Global Social Compliance Program (GSCP) to improve working and environmental conditions by harmonizing efforts and identifying best practices in codes and monitoring. In its "Audit Process and Methodology Reference Tools," GSCP warns that semi-announced and unannounced audits should be used only in high-risk circumstances and even then only after considering business relationships. GSCP cautions: "Note: Whilst unannounced audits are extremely effective at identifying an accurate picture of working conditions at the employment site, and may help uncover high risk issues, their use can undermine the relationships along the supply chain, reducing the ability of the buying company to remediate. The experience of many companies indicates that unannounced audits should be reserved for due diligence checks or to investigate specific issues (critical issues suspected, lack of commitment/involvement of the suppliers, suspicion of fraud)" (GSCP 2009, 6). In other words, monitors should operate on an assumption of compliance unless there are specific indications to the contrary. In terms of worker interviews, the GSCP protocol "Interviews" section begins: "Interviews with managers, trade union representatives (and/or other workers' representatives) and workers will take place on-site. However, it may be appropriate to carry out additional worker interviews off-site" (GSCP 2009, 14). But no guidance is given about when off-site interviews should be used.

Even for the ILO, which has set international standards for the importance of giving weight to confidential worker interviews, the practices of off-site interviews and unannounced visits seem nonstandard. There has been a lot of criticism in the anti-sweatshop movement about the Better Factories Cambodia (BFC) program (Ballinger 2009), which gave US trade privileges to Cambodian garment manufacturers. Shea, Nakayama, and Heymann (2010), although finding that the model developed under the ILO's monitoring in the BFC program was largely

successful in improving working conditions, admonish that future monitoring ventures should include off-site worker interviews and unannounced visits, the lack of which they say brings the ILO program's integrity into question. A study by Stanford University Law School (2013) indicates that the ILO has only partially rectified these weaknesses. The report finds that the usual procedure is still to interview workers in groups in the factory and to supplement this informally with worker interviews at food stalls and such places just outside the factory gates. The Stanford study also says that although the ILO conducts unannounced visits, they sometimes wait for up to 45 minutes outside the factory, allowing management time to prepare. Furthermore, "Since 2005, factory workers have lost almost all of the access they once had into the black box of BFC's reporting . . . BFC no longer convenes meetings at monitored factories to report on its findings to workers and their representatives." Not only are workers no longer apprised of monitoring results, but those results are also no longer publicly available. The program halted its original practice of releasing public summary reports with some individual factory information, although actual factory reports were never made public (see chapter 5 of this volume). Workers have no ability, therefore, to act as any kind of check on remediation since they do not, and cannot, know what violations have been found.

The lack of worker participation in the monitoring and remediation processes profoundly undermines monitoring as a viable regulatory system. Most workers in the Barrientos and Smith study (2007) were only partially or not at all aware of the codes. Many NGOs have reported a similar lack of dissemination of information. Esbenshade (2004a) found that many workers she interviewed had no idea who the auditors were. Moreover, those who were aware had been told by management that if they revealed problems to the auditor, work would be pulled and they would lose their jobs. Seidman (2007) finds that workers in Lesotho were also silenced by a fear of ruining the reputation, and therefore market share, of their employer and their country.

Auditors not only need to elicit truthful information from workers in order to produce accurate results, but workers' participation in ongoing vigilance at the factory is also key to moving beyond the "checklist" model. We know that factory owners coach workers for interviews, falsify records, and unlock doors for the day of inspection. Only workers who are protected from retaliation and empowered by their own organizations can know and report whether the doors are unlocked and they are paid properly day in and day out. This point was painfully emphasized in a report on death by factory fires written by Bjorn Claeson (senior policy analyst at the International Labor Rights Forum). Claeson documents that many of the factories in which hundreds of workers have died in Bangladesh and Pakistan were actually monitored by brand-name companies. However, because

workers are not empowered to report on the daily conditions within their factories or apprised of the results of audits, which remain secret, monitoring fails to uncover dangerous and illegal conditions and fails to facilitate addressing those conditions when they are discovered, resulting in at best inaccurate reports and at worst a wave of factory fatalities like none seen in the garment sector previously (Claeson 2012). Moreover, O'Rourke (2006) also asserts that worker participation is necessary not only to identify problems but also to verify compliance with remediation efforts. He gives examples of workers' committees in China that have helped improve health and safety compliance.

However, the vast majority of monitoring efforts does not protect workers, much less involve them on any equal footing in the process. Monitoring usually happens through an agreement between brands and contractors, and sometimes an agreement is signed between the brand and an oversight organization; with few exceptions workers have not been party to these agreements (Esbenshade 2004a). César Rodríguez-Garavito (2005) argues that what workers need is "empowered participatory regulation," that would focus on guaranteeing enabling rights, education, training and direct worker complaint mechanisms in the monitoring process. Rainer Braun and Judy Gearhart (2004) and Esbenshade (2001, 2004b) claim that Northern NGOs have assisted in developing a regulatory model not accountable to workers. Such regulation stands in contrast to a union-based participatory model, which is accountable to workers themselves (Compa 2001, 2004).

Independence and Transparency

Researchers also point to the level of independence of the monitors as crucial to monitoring's effectiveness, generally having more praise for independent monitors who are neither selected nor paid by the contractors or the brands. Both Anner (Anner et al. 2008) and Esbenshade (2004a, 2004b) contrast commercial monitors who are paid by the brands with independent monitors who are not. They find that the latter not only have fewer conflicts of interest but also more access to workers and a much better chance of uncovering violations of the key issue: workers' rights to organize and thereby gain the security to monitor their own factory.

The vast majority of factory inspections are conducted by auditors hired either directly or indirectly by brands and contractors themselves. Many large brands, like Nike and Gap, employ their own compliance staff. For these internal auditors, the central aspect of their employers' business, to acquire or produce clothes at a low price in a timely manner, often conflicts with the goal of assuring compliance with workers' rights. Locke quotes an auditor who expresses a typical dynamic: if an order has already been placed "before I set foot in the factory, I know we will give them the business no matter what" (2013, 38). There are also

dozens of commercial firms who offer social compliance auditing services, some of the largest being the Swiss firm SGS SA (Société Générale de Surveillance), the British Intertek, the French Bureau Veritas, and the American UL (Underwriters Laboratories). These external auditors, whose services are purchased either by the brand or the contractor, have an incentive to please the client by keeping prices low with quick (and consequently less thorough) investigations. Moreover, such firms are rewarded with more business when they issue passing reports to contractors who hire them directly and when they refrain from causing problems with business relations between the brand and contractor. For instance, a *New York Times* article entitled "Fast and Flawed Inspections of Factories Abroad" reported that an SGS spokesperson, in defending a stellar inspection report of Rosita Knitwear in Bangladesh, which later erupted in protests over a plethora of code violations, "said the protocol for Rosita did not require interviewing workers outside the factory, a practice that she cautioned could undermine a relationship between a Western company and its suppliers" (Clifford and Greenhouse 2013). Moreover, as social auditing firms expand business in response to growing demand in new locations, they sometimes contract out work, resulting in the same problems of control of standards that they are monitoring for.

Independent monitoring is seen as more effective, although it is not a cure-all. "Independent monitoring" is a term used to refer to both the structure of the relationships, where companies do not directly hire auditors, and a purer form of independence where the monitoring organizations themselves are actually free from corporate influence in their governance and funding (such as the WRC). Kolk and van Tulder (2002) found in their survey of six major garment manufacturers that internal monitoring was *not* considered credible. External monitoring was deemed necessary by social auditors or NGOs, although the preferred method was to hire an external monitor through a foundation, to which the companies paid dues (such as the FLA). Frundt (2004) and Wetterberg (2010) concur that the degree of independence of monitoring is a central criteria by which the stringency of monitoring can be judged. However, Gay Seidman (2007) and Wells (2007) warn that independent monitoring also has its flaws: it depends on the brands for access to factories, it requires the trust of workers, and, perhaps most significant, it has limited capacity to cover even a tiny fraction of the hundreds of thousands of factories.

Noted individual cases of real progress brought about by monitoring have been in the context of truly independent monitors and processes that were both transparent and put workers concerns and voice front and center. For example, the WRC played a crucial role in the establishment of the first independent apparel union in Mexico at Kukdong/Mexmode (Ross 2006) and in the Mombosa Free Trade Zone of Kenya at Sinolink. The WRC was also instrumental in guaranteeing

workers' rights in the struggle at the BJ&B factory, which resulted in the first collective bargaining agreement to require higher than the minimum wage in any export-processing zone of the Dominican Republic (Ross 2006; Esbenshade 2008). Workers at Jerzees Nuevo Día, a Russell factory in Honduras, won a number of concessions through the monitoring of the WRC, in conjunction with actions by universities and a well-coordinated campaign between unionists in Honduras and student protestors in the United States. The Honduran workers were rehired, signed a collective bargaining agreement, received 35 percent above the local standard in benefits and wages, and won a guarantee of broader rights to freedom of association than previously experienced in the industry, not only for themselves but also for all workers at other Honduran Russell factories (Esbenshade 2012). These gains, though extremely important, are generally in individual factories and sometimes are ephemeral. Unfortunately, they are not indicative of a progressive trend in either independence of monitoring or transparency. In fact, one sign that transparency may have plateaued is the deterioration of the ILO's BFC program into a "black box" system as described above.

There is consensus in the literature that transparency of monitoring procedures and results is a necessary facet of an effective system, although this finding is largely based in theoretical argument rather than evaluation, since no major system beyond the WRC makes reports with factory names public. O'Rourke (2006) argues that "increased transparency is the first, and perhaps most critical, element in advancing more accountable non-governmental governance" (909). Hemphill (2004) supports the monitoring model but warns that strong accountability and transparency mechanisms are needed to insure effectiveness. Crinis (2010) reports that for Malaysia, her case study, WRAP and SAI reports contain only numbers for factories, not names, which was also noted by O'Rourke (2006) and Hemphill (2004) in regard to FLA reports. As discussed above, the lack of transparency of the audits coming out of Bangladesh, Pakistan, and elsewhere has contributed to workers dying en masse (Claeson 2012; and Ross in chapter 4 of this volume). This secrecy not only endangers workers but also makes evaluation of the system and accountability almost impossible. Lack of transparency thereby also hinders consumer action. Bartley (2007) and Robinson (Anner et al. 2008) explain that the lack of a consistent consumer demand for ethically produced goods is at least partly a result of the lack of reliable certification system.

Consumer Leverage over Brands

In terms of the role of the consumer, researchers argue that the more leverage over brands those requiring monitoring have, the more effective the consumer can be in affecting brand behavior. Wetterberg (2010) differentiates between the

buyer-regulated markets where the individual consumers hold sway and socially regulated markets such as college logoed goods or uniforms for city or state workers. Socially regulated markets are more conducive to improving workers' conditions because: (1) they are in an area where market access is limited (licenses for college logoed goods or procurement for public employee uniforms), (2) there are "interested intermediaries" who can provide market access in exchange for higher levels of compliance (universities or government agencies), (3) these intermediaries have engaged some independent monitoring entity (the WRC or FLA), and (4) there is on-going activism (by students, workers, or citizens) to ensure that the intermediary continues to require compliance.

Others have also pointed to the fact that institutional consumers have more leverage and reliability in their influence over brands than do a large number of individuals with similar preferences. Seidman (2007), Armbruster-Sandoval (2005), and Wells (2007) assert that the nature of individual consumer and activist action is somewhat mercurial. Institutional consumers, on the other hand, have a specific role that creates more influence (granting licenses or making large purchases). Such institutional buyers often have long-standing relationships with specific brands and can thus exert more influence on their practices. Moreover, the purchases by or licenses with universities, bookstores, cities, and states can be a stable demand that is controlled by longer-term policy decisions rather than immediate shopping choices. In a few instances, such as the Sweat-Free Communities consortium, governments act as responsible consumers in procurement, but more often governments are involved with monitoring through the intersection of their enforcement capacity with private monitoring.

Relationship to Government Enforcement

Where monitoring is actually part of government enforcement, it is more effective. Weil (2005) shows that where private monitoring is part of a government oversight program, as in Los Angeles, it can raise compliance. He finds that putting government pressure on actors further up in the industry (at the level of retailers, for example) can force monitoring further down the chain of production. Esbenshade (2004a), while focusing on the deficiencies of the DOL-supervised monitoring program in Los Angeles (most notably the myriad conflicts of interest), also acknowledges that monitoring in the context of government enforcement and the threat of embargoing goods or complaints reaching retailers provides some improvements. As Brayden King and Nicholas Pearce (2010) point out, the threat of state regulation strengthens the potential of private regulation, since companies prefer self-regulation to submitting to the state.

However, as Gereffi, Garcia-Johnson, and Sasser (2001) warn, monitoring should not be seen as a substitute for state enforcement. Although monitoring and certification are an opportunity to highlight disparities in state enforcement, since they look at laws across governments in the process of evaluating compliance, state enforcement has a breadth and potential system of consequences that cannot be replicated by private alternatives. In terms of which has a greater effect on compliance, research has shown that government enforcement clearly outweighs monitoring. Locke, Qin, and Brause (2007) find that whether factories operate in a country with a stronger rule of law and more active labor inspectorate makes more of a difference in compliance than does monitoring. Locke suggests that if companies are concerned with compliance they locate production in countries with stronger labor-law enforcement mechanisms. However, companies often choose production locations precisely to *avoid* countries with strong labor-rights enforcement because the costs of compliance drive up wages, benefits, and infrastructure costs, as argued by Nova and Wegemer in chapter 1 of this volume. Not considering the context of labor-rights compliance in sourcing location belies the notion that monitoring is a sincere effort to ensure workers' rights are respected.

Moreover, even at its most effective, monitoring does not challenge practices that fall *within* the law but are clearly undermining workers' rights. For example, in Crinis's case study in Malaysia, contractors legally hire short-term foreign workers with few labor rights in terms of overtime pay, unionization, suitability of housing, and withholding of travel documents. These foreign workers are often hired by an outsourcing company that deducts a fee from workers' wages so that workers are paid far less than nationals and far less than they were promised when recruited. Although some of these practices would violate company codes, Crinis concludes that "auditors who monitor factory compliance are not in a position to question national labour standards" (2010, 590). Looking at case studies in China and Vietnam, where half of FLA company production occurs, Anner (2012a) demonstrates the complicated and unproductive exercise of monitoring for code provisions such as freedom of association and collective bargaining rights in a context where these provisions are illegal.

If indeed government enforcement is much more significant than monitoring in achieving compliance, is there any way in which monitoring can spur more government enforcement? Kolk and van Tulder (2002) argue that as part of code implementation companies can assert pressure on local governments to enforce national laws, and the literature shows that there are instances where independent monitoring has done this. O'Rourke (2006), Anner et al. (2008), Seidman (2007), and Knight and Wells (2007) document examples from Mexico, Indonesia, El Salvador, and Guatemala where independent monitors advocated for the

state to enforce laws. However, reviewing the reports from the WRC (which was responsible for the Mexican Kukdong/Mexmode and Indonesian cases), it is clear that these are fairly isolated incidents and not indicative of any general trend in independent monitoring, much less private monitoring. It seems that pressuring for government reform is a more likely outcome of a *local* independent monitor (e.g., in Coverco in Guatemala and GMIES in El Salvador) that is continuously engaged in the civil society movements within the country and for which government engagement is part of its long-term work. The recent tragedy in Bangladesh saw a push for legal reform supported by brands; however, that was in the context of the worst possible publicity for both the country and the brands that produce there.

There is, however, a debate over to what extent private regulation is a distraction from the task of shoring up national labor-law enforcement rather than complementary to or supportive of government enforcement. According to Robert Ross (2004), codes and monitoring are the weakest point in a continuum of possible labor-rights protections; unions and government enforcement are at the strong end and international law and trade sanctions are in between. Jill Murray (2003) argues that primary responsibility for regulation lies with the state. The enforcement of labor law actually fulfills two major tasks of the government: providing companies with a "level playing field" and balancing the power of companies and workers. Ronnie Lipschutz and James Rowe (2005) agree that it is in the government's interest to make sure that everyone abides by the same rules, both within their countries and between countries. Voluntary private regulation cannot play this role since it is not uniform, nor enforced, nor enforceable given the global and mobile nature of supply chains. Although some companies may sincerely want to regulate their contractors, they cannot count on others to do the same. Thus monitoring, rather than giving a company or even a country a market advantage, may actually put them at a competitive disadvantage. The same could, of course, be said for enforcing labor laws: although certainly a supposed obligation of the state, enforcement puts the country at a competitive disadvantage in attracting manufacturers and brands to locate production there.

Relationship of Brand and Supplier

The relationship between the brand and the contractor is actually a more important factor in compliance than the monitoring itself; in fact, some researchers argue that the contours of this relationship are the most important factors. Crucial aspects in this relationship include how often the brand visits the facility, the length of the relationship, and most important the ability of the contractor to renegotiate price when circumstances (like delivery schedule) are altered. Locke, Qin, and Brause (2007), analyze eight hundred Nike audits from fifty-one countries and find that monitoring alone has little effect on compliance. Rather, factory-level compliance is most tied to the relationships with brands that allow for negotiation over scheduling and support for higher productivity. These researchers find that it is visits not by brand CSR staff but by brand quality control and production staff that correlates with code compliance, indicating that it is the intimacy of the business relationship—not the worker rights efforts—that creates space for improved labor conditions. Locke reiterates this point in his 2013 book on the subject, hailing "strategic partnerships," which are long term and marked by frequent interaction, as more important than monitoring.[1]

All four studies that address the question find that a strong and/or more equitable relationship between brands and contractors outweighs monitoring in terms of the effect on compliance. Barrientos and Smith concur with Locke that brands "had greater influence" (2007, 78) when they have longer-term relationships with the contractors, account for a higher percentage of output, and order more regularly from the supplier. Where there is a critical mass of brands insisting on similar codes, the effect is greater. Weil (2005) and Esbenshade (2004a) analyzed data from DOL surveys of almost one hundred garment shops in Los Angeles in 2000 and both find that the ability of contractors to renegotiate price when there is a change in schedule has a stronger effect on compliance than does the comprehensiveness of monitoring.

With a growing realization that monitoring is not an antidote to widespread labor rights violations, many brands are now turning to capability- or capacity-building approaches. As the Global Social Compliance Program claims, "The GSCP is ultimately working towards remediation of root causes to non-compliances, aiming at supplier ownership of solutions and their implementation. That is why we support the development of collaborative models to build to capacity at supplier site" (http://www.theconsumergoodsforum.com/gscp-our-work/capacity-building). Here root causes are understood to be not the practices of buyers but the organizational and technical capacity of suppliers. Locke offers a description of this model: "By providing suppliers with the technical know-how and management systems required to run more efficient businesses, this approach aims to improve these firms' financial situation, thus allowing them to invest in higher wages and better working conditions" (2013, 8). However, he says the model is built on a number of faulty assumptions. First, the model assumes that technical upgrades lead to better wages and conditions and not more deskilled jobs. Second, the model operates on the premise that different parties in the supply chain have common rather than divergent interests. Third, the program is presented as one that can be reproduced across countries regardless of social, legal, and cultural environments. Locke finds very mixed results and

concludes that gains come from longer-term committed and close relationships between brand and factory rather than the program itself. He observes that, as with monitoring, brand practices in terms of pricing, schedules, and ordering small batches all continue to undermine any improvements brought about by the supplier improvement programs that brands sponsor (Locke 2013, 101–4).

Impacting the Structure of the Industry

There is agreement among many researchers that monitoring's greatest flaw is that it does not alter the structure of the industry, which is the real root cause of violations. In his analysis of NGO monitoring, Wells (2007) points to larger problems that cannot be tackled by even the best monitoring. Monitoring is necessarily limited by the mobility and volatility of global production, which is sourced from an ever-changing list of factories in a multitude of countries, so that monitors cannot even cover the factories currently used by a given brand. Moreover, global production chains were created in large measure to avoid the kind of responsibility monitoring purports to establish (Bonacich and Appelbaum 2000). Barrientos and Smith state that "purchasing practices are being seen by many as the Achilles heel of corporate codes." They "conclude that corporate codes have a role to play in improving labour standards, but are currently doing little to challenge commercial practices . . . that underpin poor labour standards." Barrientos and Smith find that where commercial demands conflict with code compliance, commercial demands win out (2007, 713). For instance, companies place repeated small orders, with short lead times for each, in order to keep inventory at a minimum. This lean approach puts strain on factory-level production in terms of planning, with suppliers having to work in bursts. This fluctuation in workload requires factory owners to either increase overtime above code limitations and/or not pay overtime properly or hire temporary workers. Locke (2013) concurs, also emphasizing the negative effects of lean production.

Not only has monitoring failed to address pricing and sourcing, so that its effect is limited in scope and depth, but also some aspects of the industry, like wages, have deteriorated despite monitoring (Worker Rights Consortium 2013). The shift to temporary, short-term, and contract work is another example of a negative practice that actually became more widespread at the same time as the monitoring regime proliferated. Barrientos and Smith (2007), in their study of factories that received satisfactory audits through ETI, point to the fact that migrant and temporary labor are extremely common, and undermine even basic protections. Even as Cambodian manufacturers participated in the ILO's Better Factories monitoring program, they shifted most of their workforce to temporary contracts, greatly undermining workers' rights (Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic 2011). The Stanford Law School study (2013) confirms that monitoring in Cambodia did not positively impact the structural issues of wages and job security.

There are attempts, especially by the Worker Rights Consortium and anti-sweatshop organizations, to strategize how to leverage monitoring to require structural change. Esbenshade (2008) documents ways in which activists have progressively, although often futilely, attempted to weave changing the structure of sourcing into monitoring schemes. One such example is the never implemented Designated Supplier Program (DSP), proposed by United Students against Sweatshops (USAS) and developed by the WRC. This program would have required university licensees to incorporate the following into their sourcing: longer-term relationships with contractors, larger orders to cover a higher proportion of production in their supplier factories, and prices paid to suppliers that would cover compliance. The Accord for Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh discussed below is a more successful example of finally tying monitoring to changing fundamental brand practices that cause violations. I argue that this success is possible only because the Accord involves a binding agreement with workers, the last factor I will explore in regard to monitoring's effectiveness.

Voluntary versus Binding Agreements

In 2004, Esbenshade argued in *Monitoring Sweatshops* that workers were left out of the "social accountability contract" created by the monitoring regime. A decade later, we are seeing glimmers of workers being brought back into legal agreements over monitoring. Workers as party to the contracts as well as the binding nature of the monitoring agreement in requiring not only monitoring but also remediation are key to changing industry practices. The proliferation of monitoring has mostly occurred as a "good will" effort in which companies show their concern for workers' conditions so that consumers will choose their products and activists will leave them alone. A minority of codes and monitoring takes place within a contractual obligation to universities or cities or an agreement with a multistakeholder initiative. Moreover, even within the context of legal obligations, there have rarely been contractual consequences to violations, and these have taken the form of losing either business with a university or membership in an organization. These codes and monitoring arrangements have not proven to be binding agreements under which workers are guaranteed to be made whole in cases of illegal firings or of owed severance and back wages. Neither do these licensing or multistakeholder membership agreements oblige brands to pay compensation for death or injury that results from safety

violations, although some brands do so as a measure of their generosity. However, this general pattern is being challenged through new arrangements and by pushing for more contractual obligations.

Creation of New Contractual Obligations

The area of government procurement is a possible avenue for both changing the structure of sourcing and for the use of enforceable contracts to implement a more rigorous process. The work of Sweat-Free Communities is key in this regard. Having developed the necessary protocols and processes to begin work, the Sweat-Free Purchasing Consortium is in the midst, through the leadership of the city of Madison, Wisconsin, of establishing a pilot project of cooperative buying in which various cities would issue a joint RFP for fire-fighter apparel (uniforms and sweatshirts, etc.) This RFP includes the sweat-free code and independent monitoring requirements, but also makes structural changes in sourcing. The project would mean cities use a smaller number of suppliers for longer contract periods and larger volume, which comes from cooperative buying. Such consolidation would raise the incentive and ability to use complying producers.

As a direct purchaser of over $1 billion of apparel and shoes per year (Verité 2015), the US government under the office of federal procurement launched an initiative to end the use of trafficked labor in all procurement. Obama's Executive Order 13627, "Strengthening Protections against Trafficking in Persons in Federal Contracts," and the Congressional legislation "End Trafficking in Government Contracting Act" both contractually require companies that sell goods to the US government to monitor the activities of their contractors and subcontractors for such common, and now illegal, practices as: labor recruitment fees paid by workers, providing false recruiting information to potential workers, and holding or destroying identity documents. According to an officer from the procurement office who presented to Sweat-Free Communities in 2013, the program will require some third-party auditing, although it is still unclear how rigorous implementation and enforcement will be. The officer stated that they wanted to follow the lead of the proactive companies rather than forcing this on them. This "collaborative" approach seemed evident in the January 2015 White House forum on combating human trafficking in supply chains, held the same day as the final rule clarifying these regulations was published in the Federal Register. Despite this less than stringent approach, the language against these widespread practices in federal procurement contracts will provide a new platform for workers and activists to demand higher levels of enforcement.

Rise in Enforcement of Contractual Obligation

It is in the university, through contracts between the university and licensees or sponsors, where there has been significant and escalating establishment of contractual obligation, and most important an obligation that involves workers' active participation. I will present the increasing use of binding contracts by discussing three recent cases. I want to emphasize that the use of contractual obligation to effect changes has only succeeded in the context of worker struggles to assert their rights and call for enforcement *and* student activism to encourage universities to cut contracts in response to breaches of the codes.

Russell Athletic was the first major instance in which universities cut their licenses en masse to enforce the licensing contracts. It should be noted that Russell is an unusual licensing brand in that its parent company, Fruit of the Loom, owns some of its own factories, making it more obviously responsible for violations in factories wholly dedicated to its production and more able to exercise control over the factory in remediation. In October 2008 after a successful unionization campaign, Fruit of the Loom decided to close its Jerzees de Honduras factory in violation of the university codes of conduct. Over the next year over one hundred universities cut contracts with Russell for breaching the licensing agreement. As a result, Fruit of the Loom agreed to open a new unionized factory (Jerzees Nuevo Día), to rehire the fired employees, and to remain neutral over unionization at its other Honduran facilities (see chapter 14 of this volume for more details). The agreement was signed with workers' representatives and proved that universities could use the weight of contract to enforce the most violated code of conduct—the right to unionize.

Soon after, universities used the power of the contract to force a licensee to set a precedent for brands assuming the monetary obligation to its contractor's workers. In January 2009, 1,800 workers found themselves out of work and owed over $2 million when two Nike contractors in Honduras, Hugger and Vision Tex, closed without paying the legally required severance and back wages.[2] Nike went through the usual denials of (1) not having work, or significant work, in the factory, and (2) not being responsible for money owed workers by a contractor.[3] Nike then proceeded to offer to pay for training and not owed compensation—emphasizing its "goodwill" rather than its obligation. As stated by the workers in a February 2010 letter to Nike rejecting the offer: "We want to be very clear that while our stomachs are empty and we have a lot of debts, we don't need training. We are trained workers with many years of experience making high-quality products. What we need is to receive payment for the work that we have done, which is an obligation established by Nike's own code of conduct."[4] Dozens of universities threatened to cut contracts and the University of Wisconsin did so.

Given what had just happened months before with Russell, the mass termination of contracts was a very real threat. In July 2010, Nike agreed to sign an agreement with the main workers' federation that committed to pay workers' severance and to find jobs for the laid-off workers at its other contracting facilities in Honduras.

In a case of violations at the Indonesian factory PT Kizone, the University of Wisconsin sued adidas for breach of contract and the workers joined in the contractual dispute directly. PT Kizone closed in April 2011, owing workers $3.4 million in severance (see chapter 14). Other buyers in the factory, most notably Nike, made partial payment. Adidas, however, gave a half million dollars in what its own communications called "humanitarian aid"[5] rather than pay the remaining $1.8 million in owed severance. This aid largely consisted of food vouchers that workers had to spend at expensive convenience stores. These vouchers were in large denominations and no change would be issued, forcing workers to either sell them at a lower price outside the store or try to collect food that would add up to the exact amount of the voucher. As one worker testified, "I reject [the food vouchers] because for us, it is an insult, because it is nothing compared to our sweat from all the time we spent working with adidas."[6] At the same time that adidas was distributing its vouchers, the University of Wisconsin filed suit against it for breach of contract. Since adidas and UW had a sponsorship agreement, UW was required to go through a legal process to end the relationship, first arbitration and then court. When the Indonesian union representing the workers filed a motion in January 2013 to intervene in the lawsuit, Judge John Albert granted the motion, finding that the workers had a valid and legally binding interest in the contract between adidas and the UW. The judge's decision led to a remediation agreement that, unlike the sponsorship or licensing contracts, workers are a signatory to.

Both the Nike and adidas cases show how companies are struggling to maintain their position that CSR is an act of charity not a legal obligation to make workers whole. Adidas actually titled the announcement on its website that came after the remediation agreement "Adidas Group extends *help* to Indonesian workers."[7] However, it should be noted that other severance cases have been settled in the wake of the adidas case, indicating that companies are being forced to take the contractual obligation established in licensing and sponsorship agreements more seriously.

A Binding Contract Signed Directly with Workers: The Accord versus the Alliance

Finally, the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, following the Rana Plaza collapse, is a legally binding agreement between brands and workers representatives. Significantly, the Accord sets a precedent in being the first CSR

monitoring agreement to address the structural causes of violations through two provisions concerning pricing and stability.[8] The first states: "An agreement by signatory companies not to offer prices to, or accept prices from, factories such that the factories would be without the financial wherewithal to maintain safe workplaces and comply with upgrade and remediation requirements instituted by the Safety Inspector."[9] Another provision of the Accord requires companies to maintain production for at least two years in the factories where they have significant production (which must apply to at least 65 percent of their production in Bangladesh). Combined with the requirement to help finance building upgrades and repairs, which creates an investment of the brands in the factories, this provision aims to stabilize production in such a way that factories have an incentive to raise compliance.

Of course, this trajectory toward obligation is not without strong opposition. Many companies have rejected the Accord based on what they see as increased liability and because they object to the role in negotiations played by unions, or what the head of the National Retail Federation called a "narrow agenda driven by special interests."[10] It is precisely the elements of contractual obligation and workers being party to the agreement that makes the Accord a major departure from voluntary monitoring—and therefore anathema to many companies. The competing Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety, initiated by Walmart and The Gap, replicates the major flaws of CSR monitoring (for a full discussion of the Accord and the Alliance see chapter 1 of this volume). We can only hope that the Accord and not the Alliance is indicative of the future.

Neither private nor independent monitoring can replace government enforcement, and neither can effectively function without a guarantee of workers' rights to organize on their own behalf. But private regulation, through monitoring agreements, can play a significant role within this context. The strongest contribution of codes and monitoring will be the extent to which it requires changes in the sourcing structure of the industry and is tied to contractually binding agreements in which workers are a recognized party.

References

AAFA. 2012. "AAFA releases ApparelStats 2012 report." https://www.wewear.org/aafa-releases-apparelstats-2012-report. Accessed May 24, 2013.

Abernathy, Frederick, John T. Dunlop, Janice Hammon, and David Weil. 1999. *A stitch in time: Lean retailing and the transformation of manufacturing—Lessons from the apparel and textile industries.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh. 2013. "Accord on fire and building safety in Bangladesh." http://bangladeshaccord.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/the_accord.pdf. Accessed May 13, 2015.

——. 2014. "Accord reaches important milestone by completing initial inspections of factories in Bangladesh." http://bangladeshaccord.org/2014/10/accord-reaches-important-milestone-completing-initial-inspections-factories-bangladesh/. Accessed May 13, 2015.

——. 2015a. "Signatories." http://bangladeshaccord.org/signatories/. Accessed May 13, 2015.

——. 2015b. "Inspection reports and corrective action plans." http://accord.fairfactories.org/ffcweb/Web/ManageSuppliers/InspectionReportsEnglish.aspx. Accessed May 13.

Acemoglu, D., A. Ozdaglar, and A. Tahbaz-Salehi. 2010. "Cascades in networks and aggregate volatility." No. w16516. National Bureau of Economic Research. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.362.690&rep=rep1&type=pdf. Accessed May 11, 2015.

Acemoglu, D., and J.-S. Pischke. 1999. "The structure of wages and investment in general training." *Journal of Political Economy* 107, no. 3: 539–72.

Adler-Milstein, Sarah, Jessica Champagne, and Theresa Haas. 2013. "The right to organize, living wage, and real change for garment workers." In *Lessons for social change in the global economy: Voices from the field*, edited by Shae Garwood, Sky Croeser, and Christalla Yakinthou, 13. New York: Lexington Books.

AFL-CIO. 2013. "Responsibility outsourced: Social audits, workplace certification and twenty years of failure to protect worker rights." http://www.aflcio.org/content/download/77061/1902391/CSReport.pdf. Accessed May 13, 2015.

AFL-CIO, U. Cardin, and U. Smith. 2006. "Section 301 petition." http://www.aflcio.org/content/download/722/6573/AFL-CIO's+301+Worker+Rights+Petition+on+China+from+2006.pdf. Accessed May 12, 2015.

Ahmed, Jashim Uddin, and Tamima Hossain. 2012. "Industrial safety in the readymade garment sector: A developing country perspective." *Sri Lankan Journal of Management* 14, no. 1: 1–13.

Akter, K. 2014. "Remarks by Kalpona Akter, Bangladesh Center for Worker Solidarity." Public Eye Awards, January 23. https://www.evb.ch/fileadmin/files/documents/Public_Eye_Awards/2014_Public_Eye_Kalpona_Akter_Speech-Bio.pdf. Accessed May 13, 2015.

Alam, J. 2012. "Factory owner: I didn't know fire exits needed." *Associated Press*, November 29. http://apnews.excite.com/article/20121129/DA2RJM0G0.html. Accessed May 13, 2015.

Alfaro, L., and M. Chen. 2011. "Surviving the global financial crisis: Foreign ownership and establishment performance." No. w17141. National Bureau of Economic Research. http://home.gwu.edu/~xchen/crisis_MNC.pdf. Accessed May 11, 2015.

Aljazeera. 2013. "Who killed Chea Vichea?" Last updated October 31, 2013. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/10/cambodia-murder-mystery-who-killed-vichea-20131028103744329535.html.

Ali Manik, J., and V. Bajaj. 2012. "Killing of Bangladeshi labor organizer signals an escalation in violence." *The New York Times*, April 9. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/10/world/asia/bangladeshi-labor-organizer-is-found-killed.html. Accessed May 13, 2015.

Ali Manik, J., S. Greenhouse, and J. Yardley. 2013. "Western firms feel pressure as toll rises in Bangladesh." *The New York Times*, April 25. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/26/world/asia/bangladeshi-collapse-kills-many-garment-workers.html. Accessed May 13, 2015.

Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic. 2011. "Tearing apart at the seams: How widespread use of fixed-duration contracts threatens Cambodian garment workers and the Cambodian garment industry." http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Intellectual_Life/Cambodia_TearingApartattheSeams.pdf. Accessed May 11, 2015.

Almeida, R., and P. Carneiro. 2011. "Enforcement of labor regulation and informality." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 4, no. 3: 64–89.

Amengual, M. 2010. "Complementary labor regulation: The uncoordinated combination of state and private regulators in the Dominican Republic." *World Development* 38, no. 3: 405–14.

American Law Institute. 1958. *Restatement (second) of agency § 219.* Philadelphia: American Law Institute.

Anner, Mark. 2011. *Solidarity transformed: Labor's responses to globalization and crisis in Latin America.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

——. 2012a. "Corporate social responsibility and freedom of association rights: The precarious quest for legitimacy and control in global supply chains." *Politics and Society* 40, no. 4: 609–44.

——. 2012b. "The limits of voluntary governance programs: Auditing labor rights in the global apparel industry." Working paper 001. Penn State Project for Global Worker Rights.

——. 2013. "Workers' power in global value chains: Fighting sweatshop practices at Russell, Nike and Knights Apparel." In *Transnational trade unionism: Building union power*, edited by Peter Fairbrother, Marc-Antonin Hennebert, and Christian Lévesque, 23–41. New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis.

Anner, Mark, Kim Voss, Sakhela Buhlungu, Ian Robinson, and Gay W. Seidman. 2008. "Labor history symposium: Gay W. Seidman, beyond the boycott." *Labor History* 49, no. 3: 341–68.

Anner, Mark, Jennifer Bair, and Jeremy Blasi. 2012. "Buyer power, pricing practices, and labor outcomes in global supply chains." Institutions Program Working Paper Series. University of Colorado. http://www.colorado.edu/ibs/pubs/pec/inst2012-0011.pdf. Accessed May 30, 2013.

——. 2013. "Towards joint liability in global supply chains: Addressing the root causes of labor violations in international subcontracting networks." *Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal* 35: 1–43.

An Ohms Worker. 2013. "Why we want to recall the labor union chairman" (in Chinese). *LabourWorld*, March 12. http://www.worldlabour.org/eng/node/557. Accessed May 8, 2015.

Anonymous. 2012. "Shenzhen Ohms factory workers went on strike: Capital and labor, lies and realities" (in Chinese). http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_71bfdef601011738.html. Accessed May 8, 2015.

Antras, P., M. Desai, and F. Foley. 2009. "Multinational firms, FDI flows and imperfect capital markets." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 124, no. 3: 1171–1219.

Appelbaum, Richard. 1999. *Report of the Los Angeles Jewish Commission on sweatshops.* Los Angeles, CA: Pacific Southwest Region of the American Jewish Congress.

——. 2008. "Giant transnational contractors in East Asia: Emergent trends in global supply chain." *Competition and Change* 12, no. 1: 69–87.

——. 2009. "Big suppliers in greater China: A growing counterweight to the power of giant retailers." In *China and the transformation of global capitalism*, edited by Ho-fung Hung, 65–85. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

——. 2011. "Transnational contractors in East Asia." In Hamilton, Senauer, and Petrovic, *The market makers*, 255–70. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

——. 2013. "Achieving workers' rights in the global economy." Paper presented at the American Sociological Association meeting, August 10–13, New York City.

Appelbaum, Richard P., and Nelson Lichtenstein. 2006. "A new world of retail supremacy: Supply chains and workers' chains in the age of Wal-Mart." *International Labor and Working Class History* 70: 106–25.

Apple. 2012a. "iPhone 5 first weekend sales top five million." Last updated September 24, 2012. http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2012/09/24iPhone-5-First-Weekend-Sales-Top-Five-Million.html.

——. 2012b. "Apple announces changes to increase collaboration across hardware, software and services." Last updated October 29, 2012. http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2012/10/29Apple-Announces-Changes-to-Increase-Collaboration-Across-Hardware-Software-Services.html.

——. 2013. "Annual report for the fiscal year ended September 28, 2013." http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/320193/000119312513416534/d590790d10k.htm.

——. 2014a. "Apple adds UnionPay payment option for app store customers in China." Last updated November 17, 2014. http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2014/11/17Apple-Adds-UnionPay-Payment-Option-for-App-Store-Customers-in-China.html.

——. 2014b. "Annual report for the fiscal year ended September 27, 2014." http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/AAPL/3710236455x0x789040/ed3853da-2e3f-448d-adb4-34816c375f5d/2014_Form_10_K_As_Filed.PDF.

——. 2015a. "Supplier map." https://www.apple.com/uk/supplier-responsibility/our-suppliers/.

——. 2015b. "Apple reports record first quarter results." Last updated January 27, 2015. https://www.apple.com/pr/library/2015/01/27Apple-Reports-Record-First-Quarter-Results.html.

Armbruster-Sandoval, R. 2005. "Workers of the world unite? The contemporary anti-sweatshop movement and the struggle for social justice in the Americas." *Work and Occupations* 32, no. 4: 464–85. doi:10.1177/0730888405278990.

Arnold, Dennis, and Toh Hah Shih. 2010. "A fair model of globalisation? Labour and global production in Cambodia." *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 4, no. 3: 401–24.

Atleson, James. 2000. "The voyage of the Neptune Jade: Transnational labor solidarity and the obstacles of domestic law." In *Labour law in an era of globalization: Transformative practices and possibilities*, edited by Joanne Conaghan, Richard Michael Fischl, and Karl Klare, 379–400. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bahree, Megha. 2014. "Wage wars unravel stitches of Cambodia's $5B garment sector." *Forbes Asia*, August 27. http://www.forbes.com/sites/meghabahree/2014/08/27/

cambodias-garment-sector-is-getting-torn-between-poor-labor-and-unyielding-foreign-owners/. Accessed May 12, 2015.

Bair, Jennifer. 2006. "Global capitalism and commodity chains: Looking back, going forward." *Competition and Change* 9, no. 2: 129–56.

——. 2012. "The limits to embeddedness: Triangular bargaining and the institutional foundations of organizational networks." vol. 8. Working paper, Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado, Boulder.

Bair, Jennifer, and Gary Gereffi. 2011. "Towards better work in Central America: The prospects for success in Nicaragua." Paper presented at the Workers, Businesses and Governments: Understanding Labor Compliance in Global Supply Chains conference, Washington, DC, October 26–28.

——. 2014. "Towards better work in Central America: Nicaragua and the CAFTA context." In Rossi, Luinstra, and Pickles, *Towards better work*, 251–75.

Bair, Jennifer, and Florence Palpacuer. 2013. "From varieties of capitalism to varieties of activism: The anti-sweatshop movement in comparative perspective." *Social Problems* 59, no. 4: 522–43.

Balfour, Frederik, and Tim Culpan. 2010. "The man who makes your iPhone." *Bloomberg*, September 9. http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/magazine/content/10_38/b4195058423479.htm.

Ballinger, Jeffrey. 2009. "'Better work' for garment workers: Which side are you on?" *Labor Notes*. http://www.labornotes.org/2009/12/%E2%80%98better-work%E2%80%99-garment-workers-which-side-are-you. Accessed May 11, 2015.

——. 2015. "Nike chronology." http://depts.washington.edu/ccce/polcommcampaigns/NikeChronology.htm. Accessed May 11, 2015.

Banjo, Shelly. 2014. "Inside Nike's struggle to balance cost and worker safety in Bangladesh." *The Wall Street Journal*, April 21. http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303873604579493502231397942. Accessed May 12, 2015.

Barrie, L. 2012. "Tchibo commits to factory fire safety programme." *Just-style*, September 20. http://www.just-style.com/news/tchibo-commits-to-factory-fire-safety-programme_id115615.aspx. Accessed May 13, 2015.

Barrientos, S., C. Dolan, and A. Tallontire. 2003. "A gendered value chain approach to codes of conduct in African horticulture." *World Development* 31, no. 9: 1511–26.

Barrientos, S., G. Gereffi, and A. Rossi. 2011. "Economic and social upgrading in global production networks: A new paradigm for a changing world." *International Labour Review* 150, nos. 3–4: 319–40.

Barrientos, S., G. Gereffi, and D. Nathan. 2012. "Economic and social upgrading in global value chains: Emerging trends and pressures." Capturing the Gains Summit Briefing, December. http://www.capturingthegains.org/pdf/CTG-GVC.pdf.

Barrientos, S., U. Kothari, and N. Phillips. 2013. "Dynamics of unfree labour in the contemporary global economy." *The Journal of Development Studies* 49, no. 8: 1037–41.

Barrientos, Stephanie, and Sally Smith. 2007. "Do workers benefit from ethical trade? Assessing codes of labour practice in global production systems." *Third World Quarterly* 28, no. 4: 713–29.

Barta, Patrick, and Syed Zain al-Mahmood. 2014. "Bangladesh workers face fight to form unions." *The Wall Street Journal*, September 11. http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323455104579012201357331012. Accessed May 12, 2015.

Bartley, Tim. 2005. "Corporate accountability and the privatization of labor standards: Struggles over codes of conduct in the apparel industry." *Research in Political Sociology* 14: 211–44.

——. 2007. "Institutional emergence in an era of globalization: The rise of transnational private regulation of labor and environmental conditions." *American Journal of Sociology* 113, no. 2: 297–351. doi:10.1086/518871.

Bartley, Tim, and Curtis Child. 2014. "Shaming the corporation: The social production of targets and the anti-sweatshop movement." *American Sociological Review* 79: 653–79.

BBC. 2014. "Apple 'deeply offended' by BBC investigation." Last updated December 19, 2014. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-30548468.

Be, Dominique. 2008. "A report on the European Commission Initiative for a European framework for transnational collective bargaining." In *Cross-border social dialogue and agreements: An emerging industrial relations framework?*, edited by Konstantinos Papadakis, 221–36. Geneva: International Labour Office.

BEA. 2015. "GDP price deflator." http://www.bea.gov/index.htm. Accessed May 13, 2015.

Benin, Leigh David. 2000. *The new labor radicalism and New York City's garment industry*. New York: Routledge.

Bennett, Graceann, and Freya Williams. 2011. *Mainstream green: Moving sustainability from niche to normal*. New York: Ogilvy & Mather. http://www.ogilvyearth.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/OgilvyEarth_Mainstream_Green.pdf. Accessed May 11, 2015.

Berg, A., S. Hedrich, S. Kempf, and T. Tochtermann. 2011. "Bangladesh's ready-made garments landscape: The challenge of growth." November. McKinsey & Company. http://www.mckinsey.de/sites/mck_files/files/2011_McKinsey_Bangladesh.pdf.

Bernhardt, T. 2013. "Developing countries in the global apparel value chain: A tale of upgrading and downgrading experiences." Capturing the Gains working paper no. 22, February. http://www.capturingthegains.org/pdf/ctg-wp-2013-22.pdf.

Better Factories Cambodia. 2014. "New study finds high levels of anemia, food insecurity, among Cambodian garment workers." Last updated September 29, 2014. betterfactories.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/2014_09_25-Press-Release-for-the-Food-Provision-Study_FINAL-ENG.pdf.

BGMEA. 2015. "Trade information." Last modified April 11, 2015. http://bgmea.com.bd/home/pages/TradeInformation#.VVGQkyHOOko.

Bignami, R. 2011. "Trabalho escravo contemporâneo: O sweating system no contexto brasileiro como expressão do trabalho escravo urbano." In *Trabalho escravo contemporâneo—O desafio de superar a negação*. 2nd ed. São Paulo: LTR.

Blanpain, Roger, Ulla Liukkunen, and Yifeng Chen, eds. 2014. *China and ILO fundamental principles and rights at work*. Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer.

BLS. 2012. "BLS spotlight statistics: Fashion." Washington, DC: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Bluhmod. 2013. "BSCI-business social compliance initiative and Bluhmod." http://www.bluhmod.de/en/news/current/detail/article/bsci-business-social-compliance-initiative-1/. Accessed May 13, 2015.

Bobrowsky, David. 1999. "Creating a global public policy network in the apparel industry: The apparel industry partnership." http://old.gppi.net/fileadmin/gppi/Bobrowsky_Apparel_Industry.pdf. Accessed May 11, 2015.

Bodie, Matthew. 2008. "Information and the market for union representation." *Virginia Law Review* 94: 1–62.

Bonacich, Edna, and Richard P. Appelbaum. 2000. *Behind the label: Inequality in the Los Angeles apparel industry*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Borchers, Patrick J. 2013. "Conflict-of-laws considerations in state court human rights action." *University of California Irvine Law Review* 3: 45–61.

Bowen, Howard R. 2013. *Social Responsibilities of the Businessman.* Iowa City: University of Iowa Press.

Brand Finance. 2014. "Brandirectory: Ranking the world's most valuable brands." http://brandirectory.com/league_tables/table/global-500-2014.

Braun, Rainer, and Judy Gearhart. 2004. "Who should code your conduct? Trade union and NGO differences in the fight for workers' rights." *Development in Practice* 14, nos. 1–2: 183–96.

Brettman, Alan. 2013. "Adidas settles with Indonesian workers over PT Kizone." *The Oregonian/OregonLive*, April 23. http://www.oregonlive.com/playbooks-profits/index.ssf/2013/04/adidas_settles_with_indonesian.html.

Brudney, James J. 2012. "Envisioning enforcement of freedom of association standards in corporate codes: A journey for Sinbad or Sisyphus?" *Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal* 33: 555–603.

Brudney, James, and Catherine Fisk. 2013. "Wal-Mart, Gap skirt the issue." *Los Angeles Times*, May 17. http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/17/opinion/la-oe-fisk-bangladesh-apparel-accord-20130517. Accessed May 9, 2015.

BSCI. 2013. "Statement on the Rana Plaza building collapse in Bangladesh." Last modified April 30, 2013. http://www.bsci-intl.org/news-events/statement-rana-plaza-building-collapse-bangladesh. Accessed May 13, 2015.

Buck, Rinker. 1979. "The new sweatshops: A penny for your collar." *New York* 12, no. 9: 29.

Burke, J., and S. Hammadi. 2012. "Bangladesh textile factory leaves more than 100 dead." *The Guardian*, November 25. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/25/bangladesh-textile-factory-fire. Accessed May 13, 2015.

Bustillo, Miguel, Tom Wright, and Shelly Banjo. 2012. "For Wal-Mart, Sears, Tough Questions in Bangladesh Fire." *Wall Street Journal (online)*, November 29. http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323751104578148463240906892. Accessed September 14, 2015.

BWI. 2014. "La Pecera: Ideas para la construcción de una estructura de poder a favor de los trabajadores." Unpublished PowerPoint presentation.

Canis, B. 2011. "The motor vehicle supply chain: Effects of the Japanese earthquake and tsunami." Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, R41831. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41831.pdf. Accessed May 11, 2015.

C&A Buying. 1998. "The C&A code of conduct for the supply of merchandise." http://www.socam.org/uploads/tx_fwdownloads/CoC_English_Master_01.pdf.

Carrefour. 2011. "2011 sustainability expert report." http://www.carrefour.com/sites/default/files/84595_RA_EXPERT_001-117_GB_2011_V2.pdf. Accessed May 9, 2015.

Cattaneo, O., G. Gereffi, and C. Staritz, eds. 2010. *Global value chains in a postcrisis world: A development perspective.* Washington, DC: The World Bank.

CCC. 2001. "Update on Bangladesh garment factory fire that killed 24." http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1150&context=globaldocs. Accessed May 27, 2013.

——. 2005a. "Spectrum disaster update: Protests continue as companies still fail to help their workers." http://archive.cleanclothes.org/newslist/187. Accessed May 28, 2013.

——. 2005b. "Looking for a quick fix: How weak social auditing is keeping workers in sweatshops." http://www.cleanclothes.org/resources/publications/05-quick-fix.pdf/at_download/file%20. Accessed October 24, 2013.

——. 2006. "Spectrum disaster—one year after the collapse." http://archive.cleanclothes.org/news/spectrum-disaster-one-year-after-the-collapse. Accessed May 28, 2013.

——. 2011. "That's It Sportswear fire: One year on workers still dying in unsafe buildings." http://www.cleanclothes.org/news/2011/12/15/thats-it-sportswear-fire-one-year-on-workers-still-dying-in-unsafe-buildings. Accessed May 9, 2015.

——. 2012a. "Hazardous workplaces: Making the Bangladesh garment industry safe." http://www.cleanclothes.org/resources/publications/2012-11-hazardousworkplaces.pdf. Accessed May 13, 2015.

——. 2012b. "Background on PT Kizone, Indonesia." http://www.cleanclothes.org/news/2012/05/09/background-on-pt-kizone-indonesia. Accessed May 11, 2015.

——. 2013a. "Bangladesh workers must continue to wait for full compensation." http://www.cleanclothes.org/news/press-releases/2013/09/12/bangladesh-workers-must-continue-to-wait-for-full-compensation. Accessed October 24, 2013.

——. 2013b. "WE WON! Adidas pays Kizone workers." Last updated April 29, 2013. http://www.cleanclothes.org/news/2013/04/29/we0won0adidas-pays-kizone-workers.

——. 2015. "Who needs to pay up?" http://www.cleanclothes.org/ranaplaza/who-needs-to-pay-up. Accessed May 13.

CCC and Center for Research on Multinational Corporations. 2013. "Fatal fashion analysis of recent factory fires in Pakistan and Bangladesh: A call to protect and respect garment workers' lives." http://www.cleanclothes.org/resources/publications/fatal-fashion.pdf. Accessed October 24, 2013.

CCC and SOMO. 2013. "Fatal fashion." http://www.cleanclothes.org/resources/publications/fatal-fashion.pdf. Accessed May 13, 2015.

Center for American Progress, Just Jobs, and Worker Rights Consortium. 2013. "Global wage trends for apparel workers, 2001–2011." July. Center for American Progress. http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/RealWageStudy-3.pdf. Accessed May 13, 2015.

Chan, Anita. 2001. *China's workers under assault: The exploitation of labor in a globalizing economy.* New York: M. E. Sharpe.

——. 2003. "A 'Race to the Bottom': Globalisation and China's labour standards." *China Perspectives* 46: 41–49.

——. 2006. "Realities and possibilities for Chinese trade unionism." In *The future of organised labor: Global perspective*, edited by Craig Phelan, 275–304. Oxford: Peter Lang.

——. 2009. "Challenges and Possibilities for Democratic Grassroots Union Elections in China: A Case Study of Two Factory-level Elections and Their Aftermath." *Labor Studies Journal* 34, no. 3: 293–317.

——. 2011. "Unionizing Chinese Wal-Mart stores." In Chan, *Wal-Mart in China*, 199–216.

——, ed. 2011. *Wal-Mart in China.* Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

Chan, Anita, and Kaxton Siu. 2012. "Chinese migrant workers: Factors constraining the emergence of class consciousness." In *Chinese peasants and workers: Changing class identity*, edited by Beatriz Carrillo and David S. G. Goodman, 79–101. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

Chan, Chris King-Chi. 2010. *The challenge of labour in China: Strikes and the changing labour regime in global factories.* London: Routledge.

——. 2014. "Constrained labor agency and the changing regulatory regime in China." *Development and Change* 45, no. 4: 685–709.

Chan, Chris King-Chi, and Elaine So-Ieng Hui. 2013. "The development of collective bargaining in China: From 'collective bargaining by riot' to 'party-state-led wage bargaining.'" *The China Quarterly* 217: 221–42.

——. 2014. "The dynamics and dilemma of workplace trade union reform in China: The case of the Honda workers' strike." *Journal of Industrial Relations* 54, no. 5: 653–68.

Chan, Jenny. 2009. "Meaningful progress or illusory reform? Analyzing China's labor contract law." *New Labor Forum* 18, no. 2: 43–51.

——. 2013. "A suicide survivor: The life of a Chinese worker." *New Technology, Worker and Employment* 28, no. 2: 84–99; and *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 11, no. 31: 1–30. http://www.japanfocus.org/-Jenny-Chan/3977.

Chan, Jenny, and Mark Selden. 2014. "China's rural migrant workers, the state, and labor politics." *Critical Asian Studies* 46, no. 4: 599–620.

Chan, Jenny, and Ngai Pun. 2010. "Suicide as protest for the new generation of Chinese migrant workers: Foxconn, global capital, and the state." *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 37, no. 2: 1–50. http://japanfocus.org/-Jenny-Chan/3408.

Chan, Jenny, Ngai Pun, and Mark Selden. 2013. "The politics of global production: Apple, Foxconn, and China's new working class." *New Technology, Work and Employment* 28, no. 2: 100–115, and *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 11, no. 32: 1–32. http://www.japanfocus.org/-Jenny-Chan/3981.

——. 2015. "Apple's iPad city: Subcontracting exploitation to China." In *Handbook of the international political economy of production*, edited by Kees van der Pijl, 76–97. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

——. 2016. "Chinese labor protest and trade unions," In *The Routledge companion to labor and media*, edited by Richard Maxwell, 290–302. New York: Routledge.

Chang, Ha-Joon. 2008. *Bad samaritans: The myth of free trade and the secret history of capitalism.* New York: Bloomsbury Publishing USA.

——. 2010. *23 things they don't tell you about capitalism.* New York: Bloomsbury Publishing USA.

Chen, Hsin-Hsing. 2011. "Professionals, students, and activists in Taiwan mobilize for an unprecedented collective-action lawsuit against a former top American electronics company." *East Asian Science, Technology and Society* 5, no. 4: 555–65.

Chen, Michelle. 2015. "Cambodia's garment workers aren't backing down." *The Nation*, January 23. http://www.thenation.com/blog/195817/cambodias-garment-workers-arent-backing-down. Accessed May 12, 2015.

Chen, W. 2012b. *You Yu Si—Reflections on 30 years of union work.* Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Publishing House.

Chen, Xi. 2012a. *Social protest and contentious authoritarianism in China.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

——. 2013. "The rising cost of stability." *Journal of Democracy* 24, no. 1: 57–64.

Chiang, Charlie Z. W., and Ho-Don Yan. 2015. "Terry Gou and Foxconn." In *Handbook of East Asian entrepreneurship*, edited by Fu-Lai Tony Yu and Ho-Don Yan, 300–312. Abingdon, Oxon, UK: Routledge.

China Labor News Translations. "The Nanhai Honda strike and the union." *China Labor News Translations.* July 18, 2010. http://www.clntranslations.org/article/56/honda. Accessed September 27, 2015.

China Labour Bulletin. 2013. "Shenzhen workers demand ouster of trade *union* chairman after "model election." http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/shenzhen-workers-demand-ouster-trade-union-chairman-after-%E2%80%9Cmodel-election%E2%80%9D.

——. 2014. "Defeat will only make us stronger: Workers look back at the Yue Yuen shoe factory strike." Last updated May 22, 2014. http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/defeat-will-only-make-us-stronger-workers-look-back-yue-yuen-shoe-factory-strike.

——. 2015. "Strike Map." http://strikemap.clb.org.hk/strikes/en. Accessed April 29, 2015.

City of Fremont, California. 2012. "Staff report 1491: Report to council on referral of former Apple Macintosh factory history." Last updated September 18, 2012. http://fremontcityca.iqm2.com/Citizens/Detail_LegiFile.aspx?ID=1491&highlightTerms=macintosh.

Claeson, Bjorn. 2010. "Twenty-one locked-in apparel workers die in another factory fire in Bangladesh." Labor Is Not a Commodity blog. http://laborrightsblog.typepad.com/international_labor_right/2010/03/twenty-one-locked-in-apparel-workers-die-in-another-factory-fire-in-bangladesh.html#more. Accessed May 28, 2013.

——. 2012. "Deadly secrets: What companies know about dangerous workplaces and why exposing the truth can save workers' lives in Bangladesh and beyond." Labor Is Not a Commodity blog. http://laborrights.org/sites/default/files/publications-and-resources/DeadlySecrets.pdf. Accessed May 23, 2013.

Clark, N., J. Chataway, R. Hanlin, D. Kale, R. Kaplinsky, L. Muraguri, T. Papaioannou, P. Robbins, and W. Wamae. 2009. "Below the radar: What does innovation in the Asian driver economies have to offer other low income economies?" INNOGEN working paper no. 69. http://oro.open.ac.uk/15241/1/. Accessed May 11, 2015.

Clifford, S., and S. Greenhouse. 2013. "Fast and flawed inspections of factories abroad." *The New York Times*, September 1. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/business/global/superficial-visits-and-trickery-undermine-foreign-factory-inspections.html. Accessed May 13, 2015.

CLNT. 2011. "Should China create a law on strike?" http://www.clntranslations.org/article/62/strike+law. Accessed May 8, 2014.

Coase, R. H. 1937. "The nature of the firm." *Economica New Series* 4, no. 6: 386–405.

Cody, Edward. 2006. "Short-lived strike reflects strength of Japan-China ties." *Washington Post*, April 25. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/04/25/AR2005042501555.html. Accessed May 8, 2015.

Coe, N., P. Dicken, and M. Hess. 2008. "Global production networks: Realizing the potential." *Journal of Economic Geography* 8, no. 3: 271–95.

Coe, N., and M. Hess. 2013. "Global production networks, labour and development." *Geoforum* 44, no. 1: 4–9.

Commons, John. 1901. "Sweating System in the Clothing Trade," John R. Commons, Report U. S. Industrial Commission, in 1901, Vol. XV, 319–52; Washington, D.C.; US Government Printing Office.

Community Legal Education Centre and Clean Clothes Campaign. 2012. "10 Years of the Better Factories Cambodia project: A critical evaluation." http://www.cleanclothes.org/resources/publications/ccc-clec-betterfactories-29-8.pdf. Accessed May 12, 2015.

Compa, Lance. 2001. "Wary allies." *American Prospect* 12, no. 12: 8–9.

——. 2004. "Trade unions, NGOs, and corporate codes of conduct." *Development in Practice* 14, nos. 1–2: 210–15.

Corporate Knights. 2007. "2007 Global 100 List." http://www.global100.org/annual-lists/2007-global-100-list.html. Accessed May 28, 2013.

Corseuil, C. H., R. Almeida, and P. Carneiro. 2012. Inspeção do trabalho e evolução do emprego formal no Brasil. IPEA discussion paper 1688. Brasilia: Institute for Applied Economic Research.

Coslovsky, S., R. Pires, and R. Bignami. Forthcoming. "Labour relations in contemporary Brazil: Stable regulations, dynamic enforcement." In *Labour relations in developing countries*, edited by D. Fuller, H. Gospel, and H. Kwon. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Costa, P. T. M. 2010. *Combatendo o trabalho escravo contemporâneo: O exemplo do Brasil.* http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---americas/---ro-lima/---ilo-brasilia/documents/publication/wcms_227300.pdf. Accessed May 8, 2015.

Cowie, Jefferson. 2001. *Capital move: RCA's seventy-year quest for cheap labor.* New York: The New Press.

Crinis, Vicki. 2010. "Sweat or no sweat: Foreign workers in the garment industry in Malaysia." *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 40, no. 4: 589–611.

CTC. 2008. "Canadian Tire Corporation, Limited: Supplier code of business conduct." http://www.marks.com/webapp/wcs/stores/servlet/MarksStorefrontAssetStore/wcm/documents/supplierCode.pdf. Accessed May 16, 2015.

Cumbers, A., C. Nativel, and P. Routledge. 2008. "Labour agency and union positionalities in global production networks." *Journal of Economic Geography* 8: 369–87.

Cushman, John H., Jr. 1998. "Nike pledges to end child labor and apply U.S. rules abroad." *The New York Times*, May 13. http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/13/business/international-business-nike-pledges-to-end-child-labor-and-apply-us-rules-abroad.html.

Cutler, C. A., V. Haufler, and T. Porter, eds. 1999. *Private authority and international affairs.* Albany: State University of New York Press.

Daily Star. 2013. "'Manpower-less' department of inspection." http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/manpower-less-department-of-inspection. Accessed May 30, 2013.

Deyo, Frederic C. 1989. *Beneath the miracle: Labor subordination in the new Asian industrialism.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Dhaka Tribune. 2013. "US okays safety accord bill on Bangladeshi RMG." June 18. http://www.dhakatribune.com/labour/2013/jun/18/us-okays-bill-safety-accord-rmg-bangladesh. Accessed June 21, 2013.

Di Giovanni, J., and A. Levchenko. 2009. "International trade and aggregate fluctuations in granular economies." Working paper, University of Michigan. http://crei.cat/files/filesActivity/34/di%20giovanni.pdf.

Dreyfuss, R. 2010. "China in the driver's seat." http://www.thenation.com/article/154484/china-drivers-seat. Accessed May 9, 2014.

Drucker, P. 1951. *The New Society: The Anatomy of the Industrial Order.* New York: Harper and Brothers.

Dukes, Ruth. 2011. "Hugo Sinzheimer and the constitutional function of labour law." In *The idea of labour law*, edited by Guy Davidov and Brian Langille, 57–67. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

The Economist. 1999. "The world this millennium." Millennium issue, December 23. http://www.economist.com/node/346572. Accessed October 28, 2015.

——. 2012. "Garment factory fires: A 'Distinctly South Asian' tragedy." http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2012/12/garment-factory-fires. Accessed May 12, 2015.

——. 2015. "Planet of the phones." Last updated February 28, 2015. http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21645180-smartphone-ubiquitous-addictive-and-transformative-planet-phones.

EFMD. 2015. "EU Cooperation: An Overview." https://www.efmd.org/eu-cooperation. Accessed October 26, 2015.

Eidelson, J. 2012. "Photos show Walmart apparel at site of deadly factory fire in Bangladesh." *The Nation*, November 26. http://www.thenation.com/blog/171451/photos-show-walmart-apparel-site-deadly-factory-fire-bangladesh#. Accessed May 13, 2015.

Elliott, K., and R. Freeman. 2003. *Can labor standards improve under globalization?* Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.

Ensign, Rachel Louise. 2013. "Fixing problems in developing world factories is challenge for auditors." *Wall Street Journal*, May 1. http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2013/05/01/fixing-problems-in-developing-world-factories-is-challenge-for-auditors/. Accessed May 28, 2013.

Ernst, Dieter. 1997. "From partial to systemic globalization: International production networks in the electronics industry." Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy working paper 98. http://brie.berkeley.edu/publications/WP%2098.pdf.

Esbenshade, Jill. 2001. "The social accountability contract: Private monitoring from Los Angeles to the global apparel industry." *Labor Studies Journal* 26, no. 1: 98–120.

——. 2004a. *Monitoring sweatshops: Workers, consumers, and the global apparel industry.* Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

——. 2004b. "Codes of conduct: Challenges and opportunities for workers' rights." *Social Justice* 31, no. 3: 40–59.

——. 2008. "Going up against the global economy: New developments in the anti-sweatshop movement." *Critical Sociology* 34, no. 3: 453–70.

——. 2012. "A review of private regulation: Codes and monitoring in the apparel industry." *Sociology Compass* 6, no. 7: 541–56.

Esping-Andersen, Gosta. 1990. *The three worlds of welfare capitalism.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Estlund, Cynthia, and Seth Gurgel. 2014. "Will labour unrest lead to more democratic trade unions in China?" In Blanpain, Liukkunen, and Chen, *China and ILO*, 13–82.

Fair Wear Foundation/Cotton Group. 2009. "The Fair Wear code of labour practices for labour conditions in the garment sector." http://www.sonatex.de/cms/projects/sonatex/media/pdf/bc_fairwear.pdf. Accessed May 13, 2015.

Fantasia, Rick. 1988. *Cultures of solidarity: Consciousness, action, and contemporary American workers.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Featherstone, Liza, and USAS. 2002. *Students against sweatshops: The making of a movement.* New York: Verso.

Federal Labor Inspection System (*Sistema Federal da Inspeção do Trabalho*). 2003–2014. https://sfitweb.mte.gov.br. Accessed May 12, 2015.

Feng, Xiaoxiao. 2004. "Sixteen thousand workers in the Japanese enterprise Uniden in Shenzhen are staging a big strike: Let's all go to support our compatriots" (in Chinese). ChinaUnix net, December 17. http://bbs.chinaunix.net/viewthread.php?tid=468440. Accessed May 8, 2015.

Finnegan, Brian. 2013. "Responsibility outsourced: Social audits, workplace certification and twenty years of failure to protect worker rights." http://www.aflcio.org/content/download/77061/1902391/CSReport.pdf. Accessed June 1, 2013.

FLA. 1999. "Fair Labor Association charter document: Amended agreements (June)." http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/links/flacharter.html. Accessed May 11, 2015.

——. 2014. "Charter document, Fair Labor Association: As amended, February 12, 2014." http://www.fairlabor.org/sites/default/files/fla_charter_2-12-14.pdf. Accessed May 11, 2015.

Flannery, Michael. 1978. "America's sweatshops in the sun." *AFL-CIO Rank and File Federationist* 85, no. 5: 16–19.
The Forverts. 1911. "The morgue is full of our victims!" Last modified March 16, 2011. http://forward.com/articles/136207/the-morgue-is-full-of-our-victims/. Accessed May 13, 2015.
Fossett, K. 2013. "Few meaningful changes in wake of Dhaka factory collapse." *Inter Press* Service, May 3. http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/05/few-meaningful-changes-in-wake-of-dhaka-factory-collapse/. Accessed May 13, 2015.
Foucault, Michel. 2010. *The birth of biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France, 1978–79*. Edited by Michel Senellart. Translated by Graham Burchell. New York: Picador Palgrave MacMillan.
Foxconn Technology Group. 2009. "Corporate social and environmental responsibility annual report 2008." http://ser.foxconn.com/SelectLanguageAction.do?language=1&jump=/cser/Annual_Report.jsp.
——. 2010. "Foxconn is committed to a safe and positive working environment." Last updated October 11, 2010. http://regmedia.co.uk/2010/10/12/foxconn_media_statement.pdf.
——. 2011. "The Foxconn Bridgeworkers No. 189." (in Chinese). Last updated June 30, 2011. Company Monthly Magazine, Shenzhen city, China.
——. 2014a. "Board of directors approved financial statements of 2013." Last updated March 28, 2014. http://www.honhai.com.tw/Message_En.html?index=37.
——. 2014b. "Foxconn corporate social and environmental responsibility annual report 2013." http://ser.foxconn.com/SelectLanguageAction.do?language=1&jump=/cser/Annual_Report.jsp.
Frank, Dana. 2000. *Buy American: The untold story of economic nationalism*. Boston: Beacon Press.
Fraser, Steve. 1991. *Labor will rule: Sidney Hillman and the rise of American labor*. New York: Free Press.
Frederick, S., and G. Gereffi. 2011. "Upgrading and restructuring in the global apparel value chain: Why China and Asia are outperforming Mexico and Central America." *International Journal of Technological Learning, Innovation and Development* 4, nos. 1–3: 67–95.
Freeman, Richard, and James L. Medoff. 1984. *What do unions do?* New York: Basic Books.
Frundt, Henry J. 1998. *Trade conditions and labor rights: U.S. initiatives, Dominican and Central American responses*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
——. 2004. "Unions wrestle with corporate codes of conduct." *Working USA* 7, no. 4: 36–69.
FTA. 2013. "The BSCI code of conduct." http://www.bsci-intl.org/our-work/bsci-code-conduct. Accessed May 9, 2015.
Fung, Victor. 2011. "Global supply chains—past developments, emerging trends." Speech at the Century 21 Club, November 24. http://www.fungglobalinstitute.org/publications/speeches/global-supply-chains--past-developments-emerging-trends-193.html. Accessed May 23, 2013.
Galbraith, John Kenneth. 2012. *American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power*. Eastford, CT: Martino Fine Books.
Gallagher, Mary E. 2014. "China's workers movement and the end of the rapid-growth era." *Dædalus: The Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* 143, no. 2: 81–95.
Gallagher, Mary E., John Giles, Albert Park, and Meiyan Wang. 2015. "China's 2008 labor contract law: Implementation and implications for China's workers." *Human Relations* 68, no. 2: 197–235.

Gap Inc. 2007. "Code of vendor conduct." http://www.gapinc.com/content/dam/csr/documents/COVC_070909.pdf. Accessed May 28, 2013.
Gereffi, Gary. 1994. "The organization of buyer-driven global commodity chains: How US retailers shape overseas production networks." In *Commodity chains and global capitalism*, edited by G. Gereffi and M. Korzeniewicz, 95–122. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.
——. 1999. "International trade and industrial upgrading in the apparel commodity chain." *Journal of International Economics* 48, no. 1: 37–70.
——. 2005. "The global economy: Organization, governance, and development." In *The handbook of economic sociology*, edited by Neil J. Smelser and Richard Swedberg,160–82. 2nd ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
——. 2013. "Can global brands create just supply chains? Response." *Boston Review*, May 21. http://www.bostonreview.net/forum/can-global-brands-create-just-supply-chains/host-countries-can-act. Accessed May 11, 2015.
——. 2014. "Global value chains in a post-Washington consensus world." *Review of International Political Economy* 21, no. 1: 9–37.
Gereffi, Gary, and M. Christian. 2009. "The impacts of Wal-Mart: The rise and consequences of the world's dominant retailer." *Annual Review of Sociology* 35: 573–91.
Gereffi, Gary, and Stacey Frederick. 2010. "The global apparel value chain: Trade and the crisis." Washington, DC: The World Bank Development Research Group.
Gereffi, Gary, R. Garcia-Johnson, and E. Sasser. 2001. "The NGO-industrial complex." *Foreign Policy* 125: 56–65. doi:10.2307/3183327.
Gereffi, Gary, John Humphrey, and Timothy Sturgeon. 2005. "The governance of global value chains." *Review of International Political Economy* 12: 79–82.
Gereffi, G., and J. Lee. 2012. "Why the world suddenly cares about global supply chains." *Journal of Supply Chain Management* 48, no. 3: 24–32.
Gereffi, G., and O. Memodovic. 2003. "The global apparel value chain: What prospects for upgrading by developing countries?" UNIDO Sectoral Studies Series. https://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media/Publications/Pub_free/Global_apparel_value_chain.pdf. Accessed May 8, 2015.
Gereffi, Gary, David Spender, and Jennifer Bair, eds. 2002. *Free trade and uneven development: The North American apparel industry after NAFTA*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Gomes de Azevedo, F. A. 2005. "A presença de trabalho forçado na cidade de São Paulo." Master's thesis, University of São Paulo.
Good Electronics. 2013. "With Apple the FLA is not convincing as a multi-stakeholder initiative." Last updated August 5, 2013. http://goodelectronics.org/news-en/with-apple-the-fla-is-not-convincing-as-a-multi-stakeholder-initiative.
Gordon, Jennifer. 2005. "Law, lawyers and labor: The United Farm Workers' legal strategy in the 1960s and 1970s and the role of law in union organizing today." *Pennsylvania Journal of Labor and Employment Law* 8: 1–72.
Gordon, Michael E., and David Jessup. 2000. "Organizing in the export processing zones: The bibong experience in the Dominican Republic." In *Transnational cooperation*, edited by Michael E. Gordon and Lowell Turner. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Greenhouse, Steven. 2009. "Labor fight ends in win for students." *The New York Times*, November 17. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/18/business/18labor.html. Accessed May 8, 2015.
——. 2012. "Documents indicate Walmart blocked safety push in Bangladesh." *New York Times*, December 5. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/06/world/

asia/3-walmart-suppliers-made-goods-in-bangladeshi-factory-where-112-died-in-fire.html. Accessed May 30, 2013.
——. 2013. "U.S. retailers see big risk in safety plan for factories in Bangladesh." *New York Times*, May 22. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/23/business/legal-experts-debate-us-retailers-risks-of-signing-bangladesh-accord.html?pagewanted=all. Accessed May 27, 2013.
Greenhouse, S., and J. Yardley. 2012. "As Walmart makes safety vows, it's seen as obstacle to change." *The New York Times*, December 28. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/29/world/asia/despite-vows-for-safety-walmart-seen-as-obstacle-to-change.html?_r=0. Accessed May 13, 2015.
Gregoratti, Catia, and Doug Miller. 2011. "International framework agreements for workers' rights? Insights from River Rich Cambodia." *Global Labour Journal* 2, no. 2: 84–105.
GSCP. 2009. *Audit Process and Methodology Reference Tools.* http://www.theconsumergoodsforum.com/gscp-our-work/reference-tools.
GSCP. 2015. "Our Work on Resolving Non-Compliance and Building Capacity." http://www.theconsumergoodsforum.com/gscp-our-work/capacity-building. Accessed September 14, 2015.
Guangzhou KRS Union Committee. 2013. "Guangzhou KRS union committee complaint." Guangzhou: Unpublished.
Günter, Hans. 1981. "The tripartite declaration of principles concerning multinational enterprises and social policy (History, contents, follow-up and relationship with relevant instruments of other organisations)." http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/---multi/documents/publication/wcms_125794.pdf. Accessed May 11, 2015.
Hall, Peter A., and David Soskice. 2001. "An introduction to varieties of capitalism." In *Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative advantage*, edited by Peter Hall and David Soskice, 1–68. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
H&M. 2010. "Code of conduct." http://about.hm.com/content/dam/hm/about/documents/en/CSR/codeofconduct/Code%20of%20Conduct_en.pdf. Accessed May 27, 2013.
Hainmueller, Jans, Michael J. Hiscox, and Sandra Sequeira. 2011. "Consumer demand for the fair trade label: Evidence from a field experiment." Review of Economics and Statistics: Forthcoming. Former: MIT Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2011-9B. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1801942.
Hamilton, Gary G., and Cheng-shu Kao. 2011. "The Asia miracle and the rise of demand-responsive economies." In Hamilton, Petrovic, and Senauer, *The market makers*, 181–210.
Hamilton, Gary G., Benjamin Senauer, and Misha Petrovic. 2012. *The market makers: How retailers are reshaping the global economy*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hammadi, Saad, and Matthew Taylor. 2010. "Workers jump to their deaths as fire engulfs factory making clothes for Gap." *Guardian News and Media*, December 14. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/14/bangladesh-clothes-factory-workers-jump-to-death.
Hassan, F. 2014. "RMG industry of Bangladesh: Past, present and future." *Dhaka Tribune*, September 16. http://www.dhakatribune.com/long-form/2014/sep/16/rmg-industry-bangladesh-past-present-and-future. Accessed May 13, 2015.
Hemphill, Thomas A. 2004. "Monitoring global corporate citizenship: Industry self-regulation at a crossroads." *The Journal of Corporate Citizenship* 14: 81–95.

Henderson, J., P. Dicken, M. Hess, N. Coe, and H. Yeung. 2002. "Global production networks and the analysis of economic development." *Review of International Political Economy* 9, no. 3: 436–64.
Henn, F. 2013. "Factory audits and safety don't always go hand in hand." *National Public Radio*, May 1. http://www.npr.org/2013/05/01/180103898/foreign-factory-audits-profitable-but-flawed-business. Accessed May 13, 2015.
Hermstadt, O. 2007. "Are international framework agreements a path to corporate social responsibility?" *University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business and Employment Law* 10, no. 1: 187–224.
Heuer, William H., and Ilkka A. Ronkainen. n.d. "Nike in Southeast Asia: Case study." https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CB4QFjAAahUKEwjg0r_U0d7IAhUJ1CYKHcL4Cd4&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.swlearning.com%2Fmarketing%2Fczinkota%2Fint_mkt_7e%2Fcases%2FNikeInSEAsia.doc&usg=AFQjCNHZsP6YX7_pQfFiPaDgb8LWmly0rQ&sig2=TiyFEPyj2WeH3w6smOXvjA. Accessed October 25, 2015.
Hickman, M. 2010. "21 workers die in fire at H&M factory." *The Independent*, March 2. http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/fashion/news/21-workers-die-in-fire-at-hm-factory-1914292.html. Accessed May 13, 2015.
Holleman, Hannah, Inger L. Stole, John Bellamy Foster, and Robert W. McChesney. 2009. "The sales effort and monopoly capital." *Monthly Review* 60, no. 11: 1–23.
Holmes, Oliver Wendall, Jr. 1891. "Agency." *Harvard Law Review* 4: 345.
Housing and Building Research Institute. 2015. "Welcome to the Bangladesh national building code." http://buildingcode.gov.bd/. Accessed May 13, 2015.
Howell, Jude. 2008. "All-China Federation of Trades Unions beyond reform? The slow march of direct elections." *The China Quarterly* 196: 845–63.
Hsing, You-Tien. 1998. *Making capitalism in China: The Taiwan connection*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Huang, Elaine. 2014. "Hon Hai precision: You are your own greatest enemy." *CommonWealth Magazine*, October 16. http://english.cw.com.tw/article.do?action=show&id=14853.
Human Rights Watch. 2013. "Bangladesh: Tragedy shows urgency of worker protections." Last updated April 25, 2013. http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/25/bangladesh-tragedy-shows-urgency-worker-protections.
——. 2015a. "Whoever raises their head suffers the most: Workers' rights in Bangladesh's garment factories." http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/bangladesh0415_web.pdf. Accessed May 13, 2015.
——. 2015b. "World report 2015: Bangladesh." http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/bangladesh?page=3. Accessed May 12, 2015.
Hyde, Alan. 2006. "A game theory account and defence of transnational labour standards—A preliminary look at the problem." In *Globalization and the future of labour law*, edited by J. D. R. Craig and S. M. Lynk, 143–66. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
——. 2012. "Legal responsibility for labour conditions down the production chain." In *Challenging the legal boundaries of work regulation*, edited by Judy Fudge, Shae McCrystal, and Kamala Sankaran, 83–99. Oxford: Hard Publishing.
ICCR. 2011. "A faithful voice for justice: ICCR and 40 years of shareholder advocacy." http://www.iccr.org/about/FaithfulVoiceForJustic_brochure.pdf. Accessed May 13, 2013.
IDS. 2006. "The ETI code of labour practice: Do workers really benefit?" http://www.ethicaltrade.org/sites/default/files/resources/Impact%20assessment%20summary.pdf. Accessed May 8, 2015.

IEMI. 2015. "The Brazilian textile and apparel industry sectoral report 2014." Produced by IEMI with support from SINDITÊXTIL–SP and SINDIVESTUÁRIO, São Paulo.

IHLO. 2007. "ACFTU (All-China Federation of Trade Unions) established a union at Foxconn on the very last day of 2006." Last updated January 2, 2007. http://www.ihlo.org/LRC/ACFTU/030107.html.

ILGWU Timeline, ILGWU Website, The Kheel Center ILGWU Collection. 2011. Cornell University ILR School, Ithaca, NY. http://ilgwu.ilr.cornell.edu/timeline/.

ILO. 2006a. "InFocus initiative on corporate social responsibility (CSR)." http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb295/pdf/mne-2-1.pdf. Accessed May 12, 2015.

——. 2006b. "General survey of the reports concerning the Labour Inspection Convention, 1947 (No. 81), and the protocol of 1995 to the Labour Inspection Convention, 1947, and the labour inspection recommendation, 1947 (No. 81), the labour inspection (mining and transport) recommendation, 1947 (No. 82), the Labour Inspection (agriculture) Convention, 1969 (No. 129), and the labour inspection (agriculture) recommendation, 1969 (No. 133)." http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc95/pdf/rep-iii-1b.pdf. Accessed May 8, 2015.

——. 2007. "Biennial country programme review (2006–2007): Cambodia." http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/program/dwcp/download/cambodiareview.pdf. Accessed May 12, 2015.

——. 2011. "Labour administration and labour inspection." http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_153918.pdf. Accessed May 8, 2015.

——. 2012. "C155—Occupational safety and health convention, 1981 (no. 155)." http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C155. Accessed May 28, 2013.

——. 2013a. "Bangladesh: Seeking better employment conditions for better socioeconomic outcomes." http://www.ilo.org/global/research/publications/WCMS_229105/lang--en/index.htm. Accessed May 12, 2015.

——. 2013b. "Labour inspections and private compliance initiatives: Trends and issues: Background paper for the meeting of experts on labour inspection and the role of private compliance initiatives." http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_dialogue/---lab_admin/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_230798.pdf. Accessed May 8, 2015.

——. 2013c. "The social dimensions of free trade agreements." http://www.ilo.org/global/research/publications/WCMS_228965/lang--en/index.htm. Accessed May 11, 2015.

——. 2014. "Tripartite declaration of principles concerning multinational enterprises and social policy." http://www.ilo.org/empent/Publications/WCMS_094386/lang--en/index.htm. Accessed May 12, 2015.

——. 2015a. "Origins and history." http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/history/lang--en/index.htm. Accessed May 11, 2015.

——. 2015b. "Tripartite structure." http://ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/who-we-are/tripartite-constituents/lang--en/index.htm. Accessed May 11, 2015.

——. 2015c. "Background." http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/background/lang--en/index.htm. Accessed May 11, 2015.

——. 2015d. "The text of the declaration and its follow-up." http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/textdeclaration/lang--en/index.htm. Accessed May 11, 2015.

——. 2015e. "Ratifications of Fundamental Protocols and Conventions by Country." http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:10011:0::NO:10011:P10011_DISPLAY_BY,P10011_CONVENTION_TYPE_CODE:2,F. Accessed October 26, 2015.

ILRF. 2012. "Garib & Garib (Bangladesh)." http://www.laborrights.org/creating-a-sweatfree-world/sweatshops/factory-profiles/garib-garib-in-bangladesh.

——. 2013. "ILRF applauds house amendment: Apparel sold at U.S. military bases must comply with Bangladesh safety accord." http://www.laborrights.org/creating-a-sweatfree-world/news/ilrf-applauds-house-amendment-apparel-sold-at-us-military-bases-must. Accessed June 21, 2013.

Inditex. 2001. "Code of conduct for manufacturers and suppliers." http://www.inditex.com/documents/10279/28230/Grupo_INDITEX_codigo-de-conducta-de-fabricantes-y-proveedores_ENG.pdf/ade5106d-f46a-487b-a269-60c2e35cdcf4. Accessed May 9, 2015.

IndustriALL Global Union. 2013. "Families hold candlelit vigil at Rana Plaza site six months on." October 24; available at http://www.industriall-union.org/families-hold-candlelit-vigil-at-rana-plaza-site-six-months-on (last accessed 9/12/2015).

International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic. 2013. "Monitoring in the dark: An evaluation of the International Labour Organization's Better Factories Cambodia Monitoring and Reporting Program." https://humanrightsclinic.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Monitoring-in-the-Dark-Stanford-WRC.pdf. Accessed May 12, 2015.

International Trade Union Confederation. 2014. "ICTU global rights index: The world's worst countries for workers." http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/survey_ra_2014_eng_v2.pdf. Accessed May 13, 2015.

IRRC Institute. 2012. "Key performance indicators for investors to assess labor & human rights risks faced by global corporations in supply chains." http://www.irrcinstitute.org/pdf/HR-Summary-Report-Jan-2012.pdf. Accessed May 11, 2015.

Jacoby, Sanford. 1997. *Modern manors: Welfare capitalism since the New Deal.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Jakarta Globe. 2012. "More than 2 million workers strike in Indonesia." Last updated October 3, 2012. http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/archive/more-than-2-million-workers-strike-in-indonesia/.

Jenkins, Rhys. 2002. "Political economy of codes of conduct." In *Corporate responsibility and labor rights: Codes of conduct in the global economy*, edited by Ruth Pearson, Rhys Jenkins, and Gill Seyfang, 13–30. London: Earthscan.

Johnson, K., and J. Alam. 2013. "Big brands rejected Bangladesh factory safety plan." *Yahoo News*, April 26. http://news.yahoo.com/big-brands-rejected-bangladesh-factory-safety-plan-122206229.html. Accessed May 13, 2015.

Johnson, Robert. 2011. "New sweatshop scandals for Disney, Mattel and Apple." *Business Insider*, August 29. http://www.businessinsider.com/mattel-disney-chinese-sweatshop-child-labor-2011-8. Accessed May 12, 2015.

Kaplinsky, R., A. Terheggen, and J. Tijaja. 2011. "China as a final market: The Gabon Timber and Thai Cassava value chains." *World Development* 39, no. 7: 1177–90.

Katsoulakos, P., M. Koutsodimou, A. Matraga, and L. Williams. 2004. "A historic perspective of the CSR movement." Athens University of Economics and Business in Partnership with CSRQuest, October 24. http://www.csrquest.net/uploadfiles/1D.pdf. Accessed May 9, 2015.

Kaysen, Carl. 1957. "The social significance of the modern corporation." *The American Economic Review* 47, no. 2: 311–19.

Kettunen, Pauli. 2013. "The ILO as a forum for developing and demonstrating a Nordic model." In *Globalizing social rights: The International Labour*

Organization and beyond, edited by Sandrine Kott and Joelle Drox, 210–30. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

King, Brayden G., and Nicholas A. Pearce. 2010. "The contentiousness of markets: Politics, social movements, and institutional change in markets." *Annual Review of Sociology* 36, no. 36: 249–67. doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.012809.102606.

Klabbers, Jan. 2014. "Marginalized international organizations: Three hypotheses concerning the ILO." In Blanpain, Liukkunen, and Chen, *China and ILO*, 181–96.

Kline, John, and Edward Soule. 2011. *Alta Gracia: Work with a salario digno*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Reflective Engagement Initiative.

——. 2014. *Alta Gracia: Four years and counting*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University, Reflective Engagement Initiative.

Knight, Graham, and Don Wells. 2007. "Bringing the local back in: Trajectory of contention and the union struggle at Kukdong/Mexmode." *Social Movement Studies* 6, no. 1: 83–103.

Knorringa, P. 2010. "Reach and depth of responsible production: Towards a research agenda." In Posthuma and Nathan, *Labour in global production networks in India*, 81–99.

Kolasa, M., M. Rubaszek, and D. Taglioni. 2010. "Firms in the great global recession: The role of foreign ownership and financial dependence." *Emerging Markets Review* 11, no. 4: 341–57.

Kolben, Kevin. 2004. "Trade, monitoring, and the ILO: Working to improve conditions in Cambodia's garment factories." *Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal* 7: 79–107.

——. 2007. "Integrative linkage: Combining public and private regulatory approaches in the design of trade and labor regimes." *Harvard International Law Journal* 48, no. 1: 203–56.

——. 2010. "Labor rights as human rights?" *Virginia Journal of International Law* 50: 449–84.

Kolk, Ans, and Rob van Tulder. 2002. "The effectiveness of self-regulation: Corporate codes of conduct and child labour." *European Management Journal* 20, no. 3: 260–71.

Kong, X. 2010. "Moving negotiations: Memoirs of June 4, 2010 collective wage negotiations at Nanhai Honda." Guangzhou: Unpublished.

——. 2013. "Embarrassing negotiations: Memoirs of the 2013 Nanhai Honda negotiations." Guangzhou: Unpublished.

KPMG. 2007. "Business codes of conduct of the Global 200." http://www.kpmg.com/CN/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/business-codes-global-200-O-0804.pdf. Accessed May 17, 2013.

——. 2008. "Business codes of the Global 200: Their prevalence, content, and embedding." https://www.kpmg.com/CN/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/business-codes-global-200-O-0804.pdf. Accessed May 11, 2015.

Kraemer, Kenneth L., Greg Linden, and Jason Dedrick. 2011. "Capturing value in global networks: Apple's iPad and iPhone." http://econ.sciences-po.fr/sites/default/files/file/Value_iPad_iPhone.pdf.

Ku, Yu-ling. 2006. "Human lives valued less than dirt: Former RCA workers contaminated by pollution fighting worldwide for justice (Taiwan)." In Smith, Sonnenfeld, and Pellow, *Challenging the chip*, 181–90.

Labowitz, Sarah, and Dorothée Baumann-Pauly. 2014. "Business as usual is not an option: Supply chains and sourcing after Rana Plaza." http://www.stern.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/assets/documents/con_047408.pdf. Accessed May 11, 2015.

Lam, K. C., and P. W. Liu. 1986. "Efficiency and sharing of investment in specific human capital under risk aversion." *Economics Letters* 20, no. 1: 83–87.

Laslett, John, and Mary Tyler. 1989. *The ILGWU in Los Angeles, 1907–1988*. Inglewood, CA: Ten Star Press.

Lau, Rena. 2012. "Restructuring of the Honda Auto Parts Union in Guongdong, China: A 2-year assessment of the 2010 strike." *Working USA: The Journal of Labor and Society* 15, no. 4: 497–515.

Lee, Ching Kwan. 2007. *Against the law: Labor protests in China's rustbelt and sunbelt*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lee, Ching Kwan, and Yonghong Zhang. 2013. "The power of instability: Unraveling the microfoundations of bargained authoritarianism in China." *American Journal of Sociology* 118, no. 6: 1475–1508.

Lee, Joonkoo, and Gary Gereffi. 2013. "The co-evolution of concentration in mobile phone value chains and its impact on social upgrading in developing countries." Capturing the Gains working paper 25. http://www.capturingthegains.org/pdf/ctg-wp-2013-25.pdf.

Lee, J., G. Gereffi, and S. Barrientos. 2011. "Global value chains, upgrading and poverty reduction." Capturing the Gains briefing note no. 3, November. http://www.capturingthegains.org/pdf/ctg_briefing_note_03.pdf.

Lee, J., G. Gereffi, and J. Beauvais. 2012. "Global value chains and agrifood standards: Challenges and possibilities for smallholders in developing countries." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 109, no. 31: 12326–31.

Lee, Lai To. 1984. *The structure of the trade union system in China, 1949–1984*. Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press.

Leng, Tse-Kang. 2005. "State and business in the era of globalization: The case of cross-strait linkages in the computer industry." *The China Journal* 53: 63–79.

Leon H. Sullivan Foundation. 2013. "The Global Sullivan Principles." http://www.thesullivanfoundation.org/The-Global-Sullivan-Principles.html. Accessed May 11, 2015.

Levine, Louis. 1924. *The Women's Garment Workers*. New York: Arno.

Li, Yulin. 2013. "Recalling the trade union in Ohms: Democracy needs to be learned" (in Chinese). *Southern Metropolis News*, April 15.

Liang, J. 2011. "Report on Nansha strike." Guangzhou: Unpublished.

Lichtenstein, Nelson. 2009. *The retail revolution: How Wal-Mart created a brave new world of business*. New York: Henry Holt.

——. 2012. "The return of merchant capitalism." *International Labor and Working-Class History* 81: 8–27.

——. 2013. *State of the union: A century of American labor*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Lipschutz, Ronnie D., and James K. Rowe. 2005. *Globalization, governmentality and global politics: Regulation for the rest of us?* RIPE series in global political economy. New York: Routledge.

Liu, Jian. 2010. "Weile Zhongguo gongren de zunyan: Auliwei nügong weiquan jishi." (In defense of the dignity of Chinese workers: A story of how the Ole Wolff woman workers protect their rights). *Zhongguo gongren* (*Chinese Workers*), July 2010. http://www.chineseworkers.com.cn/_d270684129.htm. Accessed September 20, 2014.

Liu, Mingwei. 2011. "'Where there are workers, there should be trade unions': Union organizing in the era of growing informal employment." In *From iron rice bowl to informalization: Markets, workers, and the state in a changing China*, edited by Sarosh Kuruvilla, Ching Kwan Lee, and Mary E. Gallagher, 157–72. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Liu, Yang. 2013. "Unable to come to an agreement on a wage increase rate, Nanhai Honda resumed strike" (in Chinese). *Southern Metropolis* net, March 20. http://epaper.oeeee.com/K/html/2013-03/20/content_1824635.htm.

Liu Bin. 2012. "Bantian gonghui jiji jieru yuanman huajie laozi jiufen." (Bantian Trade Union successfully resolves an industrial dispute). *Shenshen longgang zonggonghui (Shenzhen Longgang Federation of Trade Unions)*, April 13. http://www.lgzgh.org/detail.aspx?cid=8339. Accessed September 20, 2014.

Loayza, N., K. Schmidt-Hebbel, and L. Serven. 2000. "What drives private saving around the world?" Policy Research Working Paper Series, No. 2309. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Locke, Richard M. 1992. "The demise of the National Union in Italy: Lessons from comparative industrial relations theory." *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 45, no. 2: 229–49.

——. 2011. "Systemic, global change: Exploitative labor practiced in factories originate in consumer behavior. *Boston Review*. http://www.bostonreview.net/BR36.6/ndf_richard_m_locke_ethical_consumption.php. Accessed May 10, 2015.

——. 2013. *The promise and limits of private power: Promoting labor standards in a global economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Locke, Richard, Matthew Amengual, and Akshay Mangla. 2009. "Virtue out of necessity? Compliance, commitment, and the improvement of labor conditions in global supply chains." *Politics & Society* 37, no. 3: 319–51.

Locke, Richard, F. Qin, and A. Brause. 2007. "Does monitoring improve labor standards? Lessons from Nike." *Industrial & Labor Relations Review* 61, no. 1: 3–31.

Los Angeles Times. 1994. "Stores that sell clothes made in sweatshops face crackdown: Labor department may seek to prevent retailers from profiting from goods made under illegal conditions." Last updated September 9, 1994. http://articles.latimes.com/1994-09-09/business/fi-36618_1_federal-labor-laws.

Lucas, R. E., Jr. 2002. *Lectures on economic growth*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Lüthje, B. 2002. "Electronics contract manufacturing: Global production and the international division of labor in the age of the Internet." *Industry and Innovation* 9, no. 3: 227–47.

Lüthje, Boy, Stefanie Hürtgen, Peter Pawlicki, and Martina Sproll. 2013. *From Silicon Valley to Shenzhen: Global production and work in the IT industry*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Mac, Ryan. 2013. "Foxconn CEO Terry Gou on his company's growing relationship with GoPro." *Forbes*, March 18. http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanmac/2013/03/18/foxconn-ceo-terry-gou-on-his-companys-growing-relationship-with-gopro/.

Macintosh Retail Group. 2013. "Supplier's code of conduct." http://www.macintosh.nl/en/sustainable_business/code_of_conduct/. Accessed May 9, 2015.

Maier, Charles. 1975. *Recasting bourgeois Europe*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Manik, Julfikar Ali, and Jim Taylor. 2012. "Bangladesh finds gross negligence in factory fire." *New York Times*, December 17. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/18/world/asia/bangladesh-factory-fire-caused-by-gross-negligence.html. Accessed May 28, 2013.

Maquila Solidarity Network. 2012a. "Bangladesh: Workers still dying in unsafe buildings." http://en.maquilasolidarity.org/node/1039. Accessed May 13, 2015.

——. 2012b. "Another preventable factory fire takes the lives of Bangladeshi workers." Last updated November 26, 2012. http://en.maquilasolidarity.org/node/1111.

——. 2012c. "Gap pulls out of Bangladesh fire safety program." http://en.maquilasolidarity.org/node/1104. Accessed May 28, 2013.

Marx, Karl. [1867] 1990. *Capital: A critique of political economy*. vol. 1. Translated by Ben Fowkes. London: Penguin Classics.

Maryanov, D. C. 2010. "Sweatshop liability: Corporate codes of conduct and the governance of labour standards in the international supply chain." *Lewis & Clark Law Review* 14: 397–442.

Mattos, Ed. 2012. "New California law takes aim at forced labor." Labor Is Not a Commodity blog, March 19. http://laborrightsblog.typepad.com/international_labor_right/2012/03/new-california-law-takes-aim-at-forced-labor.html. Accessed May 16, 2015.

May, Stacy. 1958. *The United Fruit Company in Latin America*. New York: National Planning Association.

Mayer, F., and J. Pickles. 2010. "Re-embedding governance: Global apparel value chains and decent work." Capturing the Gains working paper no. 2010/1. http://www.capturingthegains.org/pdf/ctg-wp-2010-01.pdf. Accessed March 8, 2014.

McCartin, Joseph. 1998. *Labor's great war: The struggle for industrial democracy and the origins of modern American labor relations, 1912–1921*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

McCraw, Thomas. 2009. *American business since 1920: How it worked*. Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson.

McKay, Steven C. 2006. *Satanic mills or silicon islands? The politics of high-tech production in the Philippines*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Melman, David. 1994. "The cause and effect of the ILGWU dress industry general strike of 1985." PhD diss., Bernard M. Baruch College, The City University of New York.

Meyers, Gerald. 2004. "Union Membership Trends in the United States." http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1176&context=key_workplace. Accessed October26, 2015.

Meyn, Colyn. 2014. "ILO names factories with poor conditions." *The Cambodia Daily*, March 18. https://www.cambodiadaily.com/archives/ilo-names-factories-with-poor-conditions-54406/. Accessed May 12, 2015.

Milberg, William. 2008. "Shifting sources and uses of profits: Sustaining US financialization with global value chains." *Economy and Society* 37, no. 3: 420–51.

Miller, Doug. 2013. *Last nightshift in Savar: The story of Spectrum sweater factory collapse*. Alnwick: McNidder & Grace.

Ministério Público do Trabalho. 2012. "Ministério Público do Trabalho vs. Arthur Lundgren Tecidos S/A," Process number 0000108-81.2012.5.02.0081, 81ª Vara do Trabalho de São Paulo, Justiça do Trabalho -2ª Regiã.

Mitchell, T., and B. Jopson. 2014. "Official China union raises stakes in Walmart closure programme." *Financial Times*. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2038fd78-b262-11e3-b891-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz2xGvIg5qN. Accessed May 13, 2015.

Moody, Kim. 1988. *An injury to all: The decline of American unionism*. New York, Verso.

Moritz, Michael. 2009. *Return to the little kingdom: Steve Jobs, the creation of Apple, and how it changed the world*. New York: The Overlook Press.

Murray, Jill. 2003. "The global context: Multinational enterprises, labor standards and regulation." In *Rising above sweatshops: Innovative approaches to global labor*

challenges, edited by Laura Pincus Hartman, Denis Gordon Arnold, and Richard E. Wokutch, 27–48. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Musoliek, Bettina. 2011. "The Asia floor wage campaign—Decent income for garment workers in Asia." Paper documenting talk presented at the Global Labour University workshop "Precarious Work: Understanding the Challenges, Finding Union Strategies," Berlin, May 31–June 1.

Myers, Jack. 2007. "Ad spend to grow 3% in 2007, 7% in 2008, 3% in 2009." http://www.marketingcharts.com/wp/television/jack-myers-ad-spend-to-grow-3-in-2007-7-in-2008-3-in-2009-1703/. Accessed June 1, 2013.

Nadvi, Khalid. 2008. "Global standards, global governance and the organization of global value chains." *Journal of Economic Geography* 8, no. 3: 1–21.

National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China. 2014. "Investigative report on the monitoring of Chinese rural migrant workers in 2013" (in Chinese). http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201405/t20140512_551585.html.

——. 2015. "Statistical communiqué of the People's Republic of China on the 2014 national economic and social development." http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/201502/t20150228_687439.html.

Neilson, J., and B. Pritchard. 2009. *Value chain struggles: Institutions and governance in plantation districts of South India*. London: Wiley-Blackwell.

Neilson, J., B. Pritchard, and H. Wai-Chung Yeung. 2014. "Global value chains and global production networks in the changing international political economy: An introduction." *Review of International Political Economy* 21, no. 1: 1–8.

New Age. 2014. "Stay alert against RMG sector conspirators: PM." Last updated December 8, 2014. http://newagebd.net/74435/stay-alert-against-rmg-sector-conspirators-pm/ - sthash.9ibiiG4j.dpbs.

New Wave Group. 2012. "Social responsibility." http://www.nwg.se/en/about-new-wave/our-responsibility/social-responsibility.html. Accessed May 9, 2015.

Ngai, Pun. 2005. "Global production, company codes of conduct, and labor conditions in China: A case study of two factories." *China Journal* 5: 101–13.

Ngai, Pun, and Yu Xiaomin. 2012. "Wal-Martinization, corporate social responsibility and the labor standards of toy factories in South China." In Chan, *Wal-Mart in China*, 34–70.

Nisen, Max. 2013. "How Nike solved its sweatshop problem." *Business Insider*, May 9. http://www.businessinsider.com/how-nike-solved-its-sweatshop-problem-2013-5. Accessed May 12, 2015.

Nocchi, A. S. P., G. N. Velloso, and M. Neves Fava. 2011. *Trabalho escravo contemporâneo: O desafio de superar a negação*. São Paulo: LTr Editora.

Nova, Scott. 2011. "PR coup." *Boston Review*. http://www.bostonreview.net/BR36.6/ndf_scott_nova_ethical_consumption.php. Accessed May 18, 2015.

——. 2013. "Bangladesh: The catastrophic failure of the apparel industry's f factory-inspection regimes and the birth of a new model." *EHS Today*, October 14. http://ehstoday.com/safety/bangladesh-catastrophic-failure-apparel-industrys-factory-inspection-regimes-and-birth-new-mo. Accessed May 12, 2015.

——. 2014. "Testimony of Scott Nova, executive director of the Worker Rights Consortium, hearing on 'Prospects for democratic reconciliation and improving workers' rights in Bangladesh,' Senate committee on foreign relations, February 11, 2014." http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Nova_Testimony.pdf. Accessed May 12, 2015.

OECD. 2011. "OECD guidelines for multinational Enterprises." http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264115415-en.

OHCHR. 2011. "Guiding principles on business and human rights: Implementing the United Nations 'protect, respect and remedy' framework." http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/A-HRC-17-31_AEV.pdf. Accessed May 11, 2015.

O'Neill, J. 2011. *The growth map: Economic opportunity in the BRICs and beyond*. New York: Penguin.

O'Rourke, Dara. 2000. "Monitoring the monitors: A critique of PricewaterhouseCoopers' labor monitoring." Last updated September 28, 2000. http://web.mit.edu/dourourke/www/PDF/pwc.pdf.

——. 2006. "Multi-stakeholder regulation: Privatizing or socializing global labor standards?" *World Development* 34: 899–918.

——. 2011. "Ethical consumption: A response." *Boston Review*. http://www.bostonreview.net/BR36.6/ndf_dara_orourke_response_ethical_consumption.php. Accessed May 15, 2015.

OTEXA. 2012. "U.S. imports of textiles and apparel." http://otexa.trade.gov/scripts/tqads2.exe/catpage. Accessed May 9, 2015.

Oxfam International. 2004. *Trading away our rights: Women working in global supply chains*. Oxford: Oxfam International.

Pakistan Bureau of Statistics. 2013. "Census of manufacturing industries district-wise, 2005–2006." http://www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files/industry_mining_and_energy/publications/CMI_2005-06_district-wise.pdf. Accessed May 23, 2013.

Parker, Ian. 2015. "The shape of things to come: How an industrial designer became Apple's greatest product." *The New Yorker*, February 23. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/02/23/shape-things-come.

Parvez, Sohel. 2013. "Safety drives flop on scanty budgets: Allocation insufficient for monitoring, inspection of factories." *Daily Star*, February 1. http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=267350.

Pastore, B. 2003. "Soft law, gradi di normatività, teoria delle fonti." *Lavoro e diritto* 17, no. 1: 5–16.

Paul, Ron. 1999. "Congressional record, November 8, 1999 (Extensions): Good time for Congress to reassess antitrust laws, H11683-H11684." http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r106:7:./temp/~r1063WbG98::. Accessed September 13, 2012.

PBS Newshour. 2013. "Global standards for garment industry under scrutiny after Bangladesh disaster." Last updated April 26, 2013. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world-jan-june13-bangladesh_04-26/. Accessed May 13, 2015.

Petrovic, Misha, and Gary G. Hamilton. 2006. "Making global markets: Wal-Mart and its suppliers." In *Wal-Mart: The face of twenty-first century capitalism*, edited by Nelson Lichtenstein, 107–42. New York: New Press.

Phillips, N. 2013. "Unfree labour and adverse incorporation in the global economy: Comparative perspectives from Brazil and India." *Economy and Society* 42, no. 2: 171–96.

Phillips-Fein, Kim. 2010. *Invisible hands: The businessmen's crusade against the New Deal*. New York: W. W. Norton.

Pick, Adam. 2006. "Foxconn takes number one rank in EMS [Electronics Manufacturing Services]." Last updated May 30, 2006. http://www.emsnow.com/npps/story.cfm?ID=19523.

Piore, Michael. 1997. "The economics of sweatshops." In Ross, *No sweat*, 135–42.

Piore, Michael J., and Andrew Schrank. 2006. "Trading up: An embryonic model for easing the human costs of free markets." *Boston Review* 31: 1–22.

——. 2008. "Toward managed flexibility: The revival of labour inspection in the Latin World." *International Labour Review* 147, no. 1: 1–23.

Pires, R. 2008. "Promoting sustainable compliance: Styles of labour inspection and compliance outcomes in Brazil." *International Labour Review* 147, nos. 2–3: 199–229.

Piven, Frances Fox. 2014. "Interdependent power: Strategizing for the occupy movement." *Current Sociology* 62, no. 2: 223–31.

Polaski, Sandra. 2003. "Protecting labor rights through trade agreements: An analytical guide." *Journal of International Labor and Policy* 10, no. 13: 13–25.

Posthuma, A. 2010. "'Beyond regulatory enclaves': Challenges and opportunities to promote decent work in global production networks." In Posthuma and Nathan, *Labour in global production networks in India*, 57–80.

Posthuma, A., and D. Nathan, eds. *Labour in global production networks in India.* New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Pou Chen. 2015. "Footwear Business." http://www.pouchen.com/index.php/en/business/footwear-business. Accessed October 26, 2015.

Prieto-Carron, M., P. Lund-Thomsen, A. Chan, A. Muro, and C. Bhushan. 2006. "Critical perspectives on CSR and development: What we know, what we don't know and what we need to know." *International Affairs* 81, no. 3: 499–513.

Pun, Ngai. 2005. *Made in China: Women factory workers in a global workplace.* Durham: Duke University Press.

Pun, Ngai, and Jenny Chan. 2012. "Global capital, the state, and Chinese workers: The Foxconn experience." *Modern China* 38, no. 4: 383–410.

——. 2013. "The spatial politics of labor in China: Life, labor, and a new generation of migrant workers." *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 112 no. 1: 179–90.

Pun, Ngai, Yuan Shen, Yuhua Guo, Huilin Lu, Jenny Chan, and Mark Selden. 2014. "Worker-intellectual unity: Trans-border sociological intervention in Foxconn." *Current Sociology* 62, no. 2: 209–22; and *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 12, no. 11: 1–31. http://www.japanfocus.org/-Pun-Ngai/4093.

PVH. 2011. "A shared commitment." http://www.pvh.com/pdf/corporate_responsibility_shared_commitment.pdf. Accessed May 9, 2015.

——. 2012. "PVH Corp. announces landmark agreement with coalition of NGOs and Bangladesh labor unions on fire and building safety." http://www.pvh.com/investor_relations_press_release_article.aspx?reqid=1674827. Accessed May 15, 2015.

Qi, L. 2014. "Yue Yuen Strike is estimated to cost $60 Million." *The Wall Street Journal*, April 28. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304163604579528504234144092. Accessed May 13, 2015.

Quinteros, Aida Carolina. 2000. "Organizaciones sociales y la lucha reivindicativa en torno a la maquila en Centroamérica." http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/icap/unpan045111.pdf. Accessed May 11, 2015.

Quan, K. 2008a. "Use of global value chains by labor organizers." *Competition and Change* 12, no. 1: 89–104.

——. 2008b. "Evolving labor relations in the women's apparel industry." In *New directions in the study of work and employment: Revitalizing industrial relations as an academic enterprise*, edited by Charles J. Whalen, 194–210. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.

Quynh, Chi Do. 2015. "The challenge from below: Wildcat strikes and the pressure for union reform in Vietnam." https://web.warwick.ac.uk/russia/ngpa/ChallengefromBelow.doc. Accessed May 11, 2015.

Radio Free Asia. 2013. "Conditions in Cambodia's garment industry worsen: ILO." http://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/garment-07182013175956.html. Accessed May 12, 2015.

Rahman, Waliur. 2005. "Bangladesh tops most corrupt list." *BBC News*, October 18. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4353334.stm. Accessed May 12, 2015.

RAIS. 2012. "Annual Statistical Yearbook of Social Information." http://www.rais.gov.br. Accessed May 12, 2015.

Ratha, D. 2010. "Diaspora bonds for development financing during a crisis." The People Move blog, October 26. http://blogs.worldbank.org/peoplemove/node/1303.

Raworth, Kate, and Thalia Kidder. 2009. "Mimicking 'lean' in global value chains: It's the workers who get leaned on." In *Frontiers of commodity chain research*, edited by Jennifer Bair, 165–89. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Reich, Robert B. 1997. *Locked in the Cabinet.* New York: Vintage Books.

Reimann, Kim. 2006. "A view from the top: International politics, norms, and the world-wide growth of NGOs." *International Studies Quarterly* 50, no. 1: 45–67.

Reporters Without Borders. 2013. "2013 World press freedom index: Dashed hopes after spring." http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2013,1054.html. Accessed May 23, 2013.

Reuters. 2014. "IBM China workers strike over terms in $2.3 billion Lenovo deal." Reuters.com, March 6. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/06/us-china-ibm-strike-idUSBREA250ZB20140306. Accessed May 13, 2015.

Robbins, Allie. 2013. "The future of the student antisweatshop movement: Providing access to U.S. courts for garment workers worldwide." *American University Labor & Employment Law Forum* 3: 131–36.

Robinson, Ian, Rachel Meyer, and Howard Kimeldorf. 2013. "The strengths of weak commitments: Market contexts and ethical consumption." In *Workers' rights and labor compliance in global supply chains: Is a social labor the answer?*, edited by Jennifer Bair, Marsha Dickson, and Doug Miller. New York: Routledge.

Rodriguez-Garavito, C. A. 2005. "Global governance and labor rights: Codes of conduct and anti-sweatshop struggles in global apparel factories in Mexico and Guatemala." *Politics & Society* 33, no. 2: 203–33. doi:10.1177/0032329205275191.

Rogers, Brishen. 2010. "Toward third-party liability for wage theft." *Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law* 31: 1.

——. 2012. "Passion and reason in labor law." *Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review* 47: 313–69.

Rogers, Joel. 1990. "Divide and conquer: Further 'reflections on the distinctive character of American labor laws.'" *Wisconsin Law Review* 1: 1–147.

Rosen, Ellen. 2002. *Making sweatshops.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Ross, Andrew, ed. 1997. *No sweat: Fashion, free trade and the rights of garment workers.* New York. Verso.

Ross, Robert. 2002. "The new sweatshops in the United States: How new, how real, how many, and why?" In Gereffi, Spender, and Bair, *Free trade and uneven development*, 100–122.

——. 2004. *Slaves to fashion: Poverty and abuse in the new sweatshops.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

——. 2006. "A tale of two factories: Successful resistance to sweatshops and the limits of firefighting." *Labor Studies Journal* 30, no. 4: 65–85.

——. 2009. "China, Asia and labor standards after the MFA." In *Asia and the transformation of the world-system*, edited by Ganesh Trichur, 99–116. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.

——. 2013. "American clothing retailers should put up or shut up." *Milwaukee Journal Sentinel*, May 23. http://www.jsonline.com/news/opinion/

american-clothing-retailers-should-put-up-or-shut-up-b9917630z1-208747871.html?ipad=y. Accessed June 1, 2013.

Ross, Robert, and Kent Trachte. 1983. "Global cities and global classes: The peripheralization of labor in New York City." *Review* 6, no. 3: 393–431.

——. 1990. *Global capitalism: The new Leviathan*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Rossi, A. 2011. "Economic and social upgrading in global production networks: The case of the garment industry in Morocco." PhD diss., Institute of Development Studies at Sussex University, Brighton.

Rossi, A., A. Luinstra, and J. Pickles, eds. 2014. *Towards better work: Understanding labour in apparel global value chains*. Geneva: International Labour Organization and Palgrave Macmillan.

Ruggie, John. 1982. "International regimes, transactions, and change: Embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order." *International Organization* 36: 379–415.

——. 2013. *Just business: Multinational corporations and human rights*. New York: W. W. Norton.

Sabel, Charles F. 2014. Contribution to "Review symposium: On Richard M. Locke, *The promise and limits of private power: Promoting labor standards in a global economy*" (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). http://www2.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers/On%20Richard%20Locke.pdf. Accessed May 11, 2015.

São Paulo City Council. 2006. "Testimony to the São Paulo City Council Commission to investigate workers in conditions analogous to slave labor in the apparel industry, 2013." ("O relatório final da Comissão Parlamentar de inquérito para apurar a exploração de trabalho análogo ao de escravo.") http://www1.camara.sp.gov.br/central_de_arquivos/vereadores/CPI-TrabalhoEscravo.pdf. Accessed February 14, 2014.

Schlesinger, Emil. 1951. *The outside system of production in the women's garment industry in the New York market*. New York: The Hecla Press.

Schmidt-Hebbel, K., S. B. Webb, and G. Corsetti. 1992. "Household saving in developing countries: First cross-country evidence." *The World Bank Economic Review, The World Bank Group* 6, no. 3: 529–47.

Schneiderman, David. 2008. *Constitutionalizing economic globalization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schorr, Juliet B. 2011. "Ethical consumption is a route to activism." *Boston Review*. http://www.bostonreview.net/BR36.6/ndf_juliet_b_schor_ethical_consumption.php. Accessed May 10, 2015.

Schrank, A. 2009. "Professionalism and probity in a patrimonial state: Labour inspection in the Dominican Republic." *Latin American Politics and Society* 51, no. 2: 91–114.

Scott, R. E. 1999. *China can wait: WTO accession deal must include enforceable labor rights, real commercial benefits*. Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute.

——. 2012. "The China toll: Growing U.S. trade deficit with China cost more than 2.7 million jobs between 2001 and 2011, with job losses in very state." Economic Policy Institute, August 23. http://www.epi.org/publication/bp345-china-growing-trade-deficit-cost/.

Seidman, Gay. 2007. *Beyond the boycott: Labor rights, human rights, and transnational activism*. American Sociological Association Rose Series in Sociology. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

——. 2009. "Labouring under an Illusion? Lesotho's 'sweat-free' label." *Third World Quarterly* 30, no. 3: 581–98.

Seidman, Joel. 1968. "The I.L.G.W.U. in the Dubinsky period." *Labor History* 9: 55–68.

Selden, Mark. 1997. "China, Japan, and the regional political economy of East Asia, 1945–1995." In *Network power: Japan and Asia*, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi, 306–40. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Selden, Mark, and Elizabeth J. Perry. 2010. "Introduction: Reform, conflict and resistance in contemporary China." In *Chinese society: Change, conflict and resistance*, edited by Elizabeth J. Perry and Mark Selden, 1–30. 3rd ed. London: Routledge.

Shailor, B. 2005. "Skirting the facts on China: Barbara Shailor responds to Kent Wong." *New Labor Forum* 14, no. 1: 105–8.

Shamir, R. 2004. The de-radicalization of corporate social responsibility. *Critical Sociology* 30, no. 1: 669–89.

Shea, Anna, Mariko Nakayama, and Jody Heymann. 2010. "Improving labour standards in clothing factories: Lessons from stakeholder views and monitoring results in Cambodia." *Global Social Policy* 10: 85–110.

Shi, Qiu. 2008. "The story of Shenzhen Uniden workers' protests" (in Chinese). *Workers' Forum*, April 28. http://grbbs.net/thread-2590-1-1.html.

Short, Kevin. 2013. "5 reasons American companies refused to sign Bangladesh Safety Accord." *Huffington Post*, July 11. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/11/rival-bangladesh-factory-safety-plans_n_3574260.html. Accessed May 12, 2015.

Shotwell, James, ed. 1934. *Origins of the International Labor Organization*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Silver, Beverly J. 2003. *Forces of labor: Workers' movements and globalization since 1870*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sims, Emily. 2013. "Getting the most out of company efforts to protect workers' rights: A view from the ILO helpdesk for business." Paper presented at the Workers Rights in a Global Economy conference, Bellagio, Italy, July 7.

Smith, Sandy. 2013. "ILO launches program aimed at improving safety in Bangladesh garment industry." *EHS Today*, October 22. http://ehstoday.com/safety/ilo-launches-program-aimed-improving-safety-bangladesh-garment-industry. Accessed May 12, 2015.

Smith, Ted, David A. Sonnenfeld, and David Naguib Pellow, eds. 2006. *Challenging the chip: Labor rights and environmental justice in the global electronics industry*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

SOL's Europe. 2013. "Sustainable development." http://www.sols-europe.com/ESA/esa/Marque.jsp?@where.ID@comp.SelectContenuSeul=14&idC=11. Accessed May 28, 2013.

Sousa Lima, A. M. 2009. "As faces da subcontratação do trabalho: Um estudo com trabalhadoras e trabalhadores da confecção de roupas de cianorte e região." PhD diss., Institute of Philosophy and Human Sciences, University of Campinas, São Paulo, Brazil.

Stanford University Law School. 2013. "Monitoring in the dark: An evaluation of the International Labour Organization's Better Factories Cambodia monitoring and reporting program." https://humanrightsclinic.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Monitoring-in-the-Dark-Stanford-WRC.pdf. Accessed May 11, 2015.

Staritz, C., G. Gereffi, and O. Cattaneo, eds. 2011. "Shifting end markets and upgrading prospects in global value chains." *International Journal of Technological Learning, Innovation and Development* 4, no. 1–3: 13–257.

Starosta, Guido. 2010. "The outsourcing of manufacturing and the rise of giant global contractors: A Marxian approach to some recent transformations of global value chains." *New Political Economy* 15, no. 4: 543–63.

Stein, Leon. 1977. *Out of the sweatshop: The struggle for industrial democracy*. New York: Quadrangle.

Stevis, Dimitris, and Michael Fichter. 2012. "International framework agreements in the United States: Escaping, projecting, or globalizing social dialogue." *Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal* 33, no. 1: 667–90.

Stillman, S. 2013. "Death traps: The Bangladesh garment-factory disaster." *The New Yorker*, May 1. http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/death-traps-the-bangladesh-garment-factory-disaster. Accessed May 13, 2015.

Streeck, Wolfgang. 2005. "The sociology of labor markets and trade unions." In *The handbook of economic sociology*, edited by Neil J. Smesler and Richard Swedberg, 254–83. 2nd ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Strom, Stephanie. 1996. "A sweetheart becomes suspect: Looking behind those Kathie Lee labels." *New York Times*, June 27. http://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/27/business/a-sweetheart-becomes-suspect-looking-behind-those-kathie-lee-labels.html. Accessed May 16, 2015.

Sturgeon, Timothy, John Humphrey, and Gary Gereffi. 2011. "Making the global supply base." In Hamilton, Petrovic, and Senauer, *The market makers*, 231–54.

Su, Julie. 1997. "El Monte Thai garment workers: Slave sweatshops." In Ross, *No sweat*, 143–49.

Swenson, Peter. 1989. *Fair shares: Unions, pay and politics in Sweden and West Germany*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

——. 2002. *Capitalists against markets: The making of labor markets and welfare states in the United States and Sweden*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Szasz, Andrew. 2011. "The costs of ethical consuming." *Boston Review*. http://www.bostonreview.net/BR36.6/ndf_andrew_szasz_ethical_consumption.php. Accessed May 10, 2015.

Tajgman, D. 2011. "Corporate social responsibility meets traditional supervision of fundamental labour rights: Why CSR needs social dialogue to fill the governance gaps." In *The role of labour standards in development: From theory to sustainable practice?*, edited by T. Novitz and D. Mangan, 188–223. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tao, Qingqing. 2012. "Ohms trade union voting for a trade union chair" (in Chinese). *Southern Daily*, May 30.

Taylor, Bill, Chang Kai, and Li Qi. 2003. *Industrial relations in China*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

Tedlow, Richard. 2003. *Giants of enterprise: Seven business innovators and the empires they built*. New York: Harper Business.

Teixeira, F. 2007. *The history of the São Paulo textile industry*. São Paulo: SINDITEXTIL.

Tickle, Cindy. 2009. "Top business schools integrating corporate social responsibility." *MatterNetwork*, October 22. http://www.matternetwork.com/2009/10/aspen-institutes-top-10-business.cfm. Accessed May 10, 2015.

Toffel, M., J. Short, and M. Ouellet. 2012. "Reinforcing regulatory regimes: How states, civil society and codes of conduct promote adherence to global labor standards." Harvard Business School working paper 13-045.

Tomlins, Christopher. 2015. "The presence and absence of legal mind: A commentary on Duncan Kennedy's 'Three globalizations of law and legal thought.'" *Law and Contemporary Problems* 78: 1–17.

Transparency International. 2013. "In Bangladesh corruption kills hundreds." http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/in_bangladesh_corruption_kills_hundreds. Accessed May 30, 2013.

Traub-Merz, Rudolf. 2012. "All-China Federation of Trade Unions: Structure, functions and the challenge of collective bargaining." In *Industrial democracy in China: With additional studies on Germany, South-Korea and Vietnam*, edited by Rudolf Traub-Merz and Kinglun Ngok, 11–60. Beijing: China Social Sciences Press. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/china/09128/09128-english%20version.pdf.

Tucker, Eric. 2012. "Labor's many constitutions (and capital's too)." *Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal* 33: 355–78.

UK DFID. 2013. "Capturing the Gains." http://www.capturingthegains.org.

Ullah Mirdha, R. 2014. "BGMEA opposes retailers' plan." *The Daily Star*, February 15. http://m.thedailystar.net/bgmea-opposes-retailers-plan-11401. Accessed May 13, 2015.

UNCOMTRADE. 2000–2013. "United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database." http://comtrade.un.org/db.

UNCTAD. 2013. "Global value chains: Investment and trade for development: World Investment Report 2013." http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2013_en.pdf. Accessed May 8, 2015.

Unger, J., and A. Chan. 1995. "China, corporatism, and the East Asian model." *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 33: 29–53.

Unger, Jonathan, Diana Beaumont, and Anita Chan. 2011. "Did unionization make a difference? Work conditions and trade union activity at Chinese Walmart stores." In Chan, *Wal-Mart in China*, 217–38.

UN Global Compact. 2015a. "About the UN Global Compact." http://globalcompactfoundation.org/about-ungc.php. Accessed May 11, 2015.

——. 2015b. "Frequently asked questions." https://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/faq.html. Accessed May 11, 2015.

——. 2015c. "How to participate: The corporate commitment." https://www.unglobalcompact.org/HowToParticipate/Business_Participation/index.html. Accessed May 11, 2015.

——. 2015d. "Integrity measures." https://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/IntegrityMeasures/index.html. Accessed May 11, 2015.

United Nations General Assembly and Human Rights Council. 2008. "Protect, respect and remedy: A framework for business and human rights." Report of the special representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, Professor John Ruggie. http://www.reports-and-materials.org/sites/default/files/reports-and-materials/Ruggie-report-7-Apr-2008.pdf. Accessed May 12, 2015.

University of Minnesota Human Rights Library. 2015. "The global Sullivan principles." http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/links/sullivanprinciples.html. Accessed May 11, 2015.

US Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2012. "Consumer expenditure survey." http://www.bls.gov/cex/2011/Standard/quintile.pdf. Accessed May 25, 2013.

——. 2015. "Consumer price index." https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/release?rid=10. Accessed May 13, 2015.

US Department of Justice. 2011. "Business review letter regarding Worker Rights Consortium's proposed 'Designated Suppliers Program.'" Last updated December 16, 2011. http://www.workersrights.org/dsp/.

US Department of Labor. 1997. "Summary of apparel industry's partnership agreement." Last updated April 14, 1997. http://actrav.itcilo.org/actrav-english/telearn/global/ilo/guide/apparell.htm.

Verité. 2015. "Strengthening protections against in persons in federal and corporate supply chains." http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/237137.pdf. Accessed May 11, 2015.

VF Corporation. 2011. "Joint statement." http://vfc.com/VF/corporation/resources/images/Content-Pages/Global-Compliance/joint-statement.pdf. Accessed May 13, 2015.

Vogel, David. 2006. *The market for virtue: The potential and limits of corporate social responsibility*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

——. 2010. "The private regulation of global corporate conduct: Achievement and limitations." *Business and Society* 49, no. 1: 68–87.

Waldinger, Roger, Chris Erickson, Ruth Milkman, Daniel J. B. Mitchell, Abel Valenzuea, Kent Wong, and Maurice Zeitlin. 1998. "Helots no more: A case study of the justice for janitors campaign in Los Angeles." In *Organizing to win*, edited by Kate Bronfenbrenner, Sheldon Friedman, Richard W. Hurd, Rudolph Oswald, and Ronald L. Seeber, 102–19. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Wall Street Journal. 2014a. "Four dead in Cambodia garment strike." Last updated January 3, 2014. http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304325004579297511167310046.

——. 2014b. "Cambodia Sets Minimum Wage Below Union Demands." November 12, 2014. http://www.wsj.com/articles/cambodia-sets-minimum-wage-below-union-demands-1415789944

Walmart. 2012. "Standards for suppliers." http://corporate.walmart.com/global-responsibility/ethical-sourcing/standards-for-suppliers. Accessed May 28, 2013.

——. 2013. "Wal-Mart statement on IndustriALL Bangladesh factory labor proposal." http://news.walmart.com/news-archive/2013/05/14/walmart-statement-on-industriall-bangladesh-factory-labor-proposal. Accessed May 12, 2015.

——. 2014. "Global responsibility report." http://www.corporatereport.com/walmart/2014/grr/compliance_worker_safety.html.

Walsh, D., and S. Greenhouse. 2012a. "Inspectors certified Pakistani factory as safe before disaster." *The New York Times*, September 19. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/20/world/asia/pakistan-factory-passed-inspection-before-fire.html?pagewanted=all. Accessed May 13, 2015.

——. 2012b. "Certified safe, a factory in Karachi still quickly burned." *The New York Times*, December 7. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/08/world/asia/pakistan-factory-fire-shows-flaws-in-monitoring.html?hp&_r=0. Accessed May 13, 2015.

Wang, Haiyan, Richard P. Appelbaum, Francesca Degiuli, and Nelson Lichtenstein. 2009. "China's new labor contract law: Is China moving towards increased power for workers?" *Third World Quarterly* 30, no. 3: 485–501.

Washington Post. 1989. "For the record." Last updated January 24, 1989.

Weil, David. 2005. "Public enforcement/private monitoring: Evaluating a new approach to regulating the minimum wage." *Industrial & Labor Relations Review* 58, no. 2: 238–57.

——. 2010. "Improving workplace conditions through strategic enforcement." http://www.dol.gov/whd/resources/strategicEnforcement.pdf. Accessed May 11, 2015.

——. 2012. "Examining the underpinnings of labor standards compliance in low wage industries." Report to the Russell Sage Foundation. http://www.russellsage.org/sites/all/files/Weil.Final%20Report%202012.pdf. Accessed May 16, 2015.

——. 2014. *The fissured workplace: Why work became so bad for so many and what can be done to improve it.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Wells, Don. 2007. "Too weak for the job: Corporate codes of conduct, non-governmental organizations and the regulation of international labour standards." *Global Social Policy* 7, no. 1: 51–74.

Westervelt, A. 2015. "Two years after Rana Plaza, have conditions improved in Bangladesh's factories?" *The Guardian*, April 24. http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2015/apr/24/bangladesh-factories-building-collapse-garment-dhaka-rana-plaza-brands-hm-gap-workers-construction. Accessed May 13, 2015.

Wetterberg, Anna. 2010. "Harder soft law: Private labor standards in socially regulated markets." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Atlanta, GA, August 14.

White, George, and Patrick McDonnell. 1997. "Sweatshop workers to get $2 million." *Los Angeles Times*, October 24. http://articles.latimes.com/1997/oct/24/business/fi-46054.

Whittaker, D. H., T. Zhu, T. Sturgeon, M. H. Tsai, and T. Okita. 2010. "Compressed development." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 45: 439–67.

Wolf, C. 2001. "China's capitalists join the party." *The New York Times*, August 13. http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/13/opinion/13WOLF.html. Accessed May 13, 2015.

Wood, Z. 2010. "Child labor hotspots identified in 12 emerging economies." *The Guardian*, December 2. http://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/dec/02/child-labour-hotspots. Accessed May 13, 2015.

Worker Rights Consortium. 2008. "Assessment re Jerzees de Honduras (Russell Corporation)," November 7, 2008, http://www.workersrights.org/Freports/Jerzees%20de%20Honduras%2011-07-08.pdf.

——. 2012. "Saturday's devastating factory fire in Bangladesh and the urgent need for reform." http://www.workersrights.org/university/memo/113012.html. Accessed May 13, 2015.

——. 2013. "Global wage trends for apparel workers, 2001–2011." https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/labor/report/2013/07/11/69255/global-wage-trends-for-apparel-workers-2001-2011/. Accessed May 11, 2015.

——. 2014. "Crackdown in Cambodia: Workers seeking higher wages meet violent repression." http://www.workersrights.org/freports/WRC%20Report%20-%20Crackdown%20in%20Cambodia%203.24.14.pdf. Accessed May 12, 2015.

The World Bank. 2005. "Global economic prospects 2006: Economic implications of remittances and migration." http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/GEP/GEParchives/GEP2006/343200GEP02006.pdf. Accessed May 11, 2015.

WRAP. 2015. "WRAP's 12 Principles." http://www.wrapcompliance.org./en/12-principles. Accessed September 12, 2015.

Wrinkle, Haley. 2011. "Better Factories Cambodia: Transparency and Workers Rights." Unpublished Masters thesis, University of California, Santa Barbara.

WTO. 2014. "Statsical database, online." http://stat.wto.org/StatisticalProgram/WSDBStatProgramHome.aspx?Language=E.

Xinhua. 2013. "Xi asks labor unions to protect workers' rights." Last updated October 23, 2013. http://en.acftu.org/28623/201405/12/140512173707181.shtml.

Yardley, Jim. 2012. "Horrific fire revealed a gap in safety for global brands." *The New York Times*, December 7. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/07/world/asia/bangladesh-fire-exposes-safety-gap-in-supply-chain.html?_r=0. Accessed May 11, 2015.

Ying, Zhaoping. 2003. "Trade union direct election: A process driven by foreigners to transform workers' rights" (in Chinese). *Southern Daily*, June 25.

Zhang, Xiang. 2015. "Foxconn's long hours causing workers' deaths: Union." *China Daily*, February 3. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-02/03/content_19477082.htm.